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THE WORD AND THE RIVER: 
PEDAGOGY AS SCHOLARSHIP 
AS STRUGGLE* 
CHARLES R. LAWRENCE, nI** 
I. PROLOGUE: AN UNTRANSLATED DREAM! 
ABOUT THE WORD 
I am sitting in a room. On the other side of the room a man and a 
woman sit at a small table. The room is large, stark, and empty except 
for the chairs in which its occupants sit and the table. The man and the 
woman are talking. They are talking about me. They talk as if I were 
not there, although both are obviously aware of my presence. 
The man is white, balding, bearded. I do not recognize him, but I 
know he is a colleague at the prestigious law school where I have been 
teaching as a visiting professor. He is sitting in the far corner of the 
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1. This narrative first appeared as Charles R. Lawrence, III, A Dream: On Discovering the 
Significance 0/ Fear, 10 NOVA L.J. 627 (1986). In it I record, to the best of my ability, an actual 
dream I had in 1981 when I was on the faculty of the University of San Francisco Law School and 
was a visiting professor at Boalt Law School. When I awoke, I went immediately to my typewriter 
and tried to put the dream down exactly as I had dreamed it. I read it through twice and put it 
aside, deciding that it was too personal and perhaps too provocative to share. Five years later, when 
the Nova Law Journal asked me to contribute to a volume entitled Transforming Legal Education: 
A Symposium of Provocative Thought, I remembered the dream and, after considerable searching, 
found my discarded draft beneath one of the piles of paper on my office shelves. I showed it to a 
couple of friends, who wisely counseled me to keep it in mothballs. "Who knows. You might want 
to teach at one of those prestigious law schools one day," they cautioned. "Perhaps you could edit it 
to make it more abstract and theoretical-less concrete and personal." 
Obviously I gave their wisdom little heed. The dream, and Roberto Unger's Passion, through 
which I had recently struggled, counseled a different wisdom. I have edited the original draft only 
minimally, choosing to sacrifice what might have been gained in stylistic refinement in order to 
preserve the chronology and feel of the dream. 
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room behind the small table. He leans back in his chair. His body lan-
guage conveys aloofness, arrogance, and condescension. Occasionally he 
looks off into the distance, as if reflecting on some important thought. 
The woman sits on the other side of the table. She is a colleague at 
my home school, the University of San Francisco, and a friend. She 
knows that I am able to hear them but pretends that I am not there. I 
think she does so because she is embarrassed, both for me and for herself. 
She is embarrassed by my invisibility and by her own tacit complicity in 
rendering me invisible. But she is not comfortable with confrontation. 
She knows I am capable of making myself seen and heard. If I choose to 
ignore them, she will allow it. 
My colleague from USF is defending me, or rebutting the argument 
the gentleman from the more prominent institution is making against me. 
She does not presurp.e to represent me. (Remember that all three of us 
are acting as if I were not there. And, at this point, I think we may all 
believe it.) The discussion is about my qualifications to assume a full-
time teaching position at the eminent law school I am visiting. Its tone is 
more that of an academic debate than a trial or a hearing. Again, I 
remark on my invisibility because the debate seems less a debate about 
me than a debate on the capabilities of my species. 
My friend from USF has just said something in my favor. In the 
dream, I do not actually hear her words, but she is very earnest. The 
man across the table barely listens to her argument, though his professo-
rial theatrics mime all the appropriate listening postures. He deigns to 
listen, but he already knows that she is wrong. He is preparing his 
rebuttal. 
He says (and I think these are the first words I hear), 
But what has he done, produced? Does he have an area where he can 
really claim expertise? Why, just the other day I was talking to one of 
his admiring students. She praised his teaching, but when I asked her 
if she couId direct me to an important and well-recognized scholarly 
contribution he had made to the field, she could not. 
At this point I pick up my chair and cross the room to join the 
conversation. I must speak for myself. I can no longer accept invisibil-
ity. I am not experiencing anger. I don't remember deciding that I must 
make my presence known and felt. I simply get up and move because it 
seems the right time to do so. 
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"I have done a not insignificant amount of work in the area of equal 
protection," I say, "particularly with reference to its application to issues 
of race discrimination." 
I say this as if I had always been part of the conversation. The 
gentleman seems, at first, mildly startled by my presence. But his expres-
sion changes quickly from surprise to anticipated triumph. It is a look 
that says, Now I have you where I want you. He will test me and prove 
me a presumptuous fool. 
"What is the significance of fear?" he asks, raising his eyebrows-
anticipating that I will not answer. He knows he has won. He will prove 
his point to the young woman across the table. 
I have a sinking sensation in my stomach. My palms are sweaty. I 
do not know the answer. I don't even understand the question. I have 
failed my race. For a brief and agonizing moment I am transported back 
to a first-year contracts class at Yale. I am one of two black students in 
the class, on my feet struggling to make some sense of Professor Kessler's 
hypotheticals about consideration and my progress up a flagpole. 
Then, just as suddenly, I am back at the table with the professor 
from the prominent law school who would disparage my colleagueship. 
But now I am very calm ("cold," in the honorific sense that word is used 
in the street vernacular). I realize now that I have won. Even before I 
have conceptualized my answer, I know that I will triumph. I am no 
longer struggling to find my protagonist's answer. I am calmly contem-
plating my own. Because I am now in search of my own answer, I know 
it is there and that it is right. It just needs discovering. 
The answer is not fully given in the dream. But in the millisecond 
before I wake, it is fully conceived. I have begun to respond, and my 
protagonist understands that he should have never given me the 
opportunity. 
This is my answer: 
The significance of fear must be understood from two points of view: 
that of the oppressor, or master, and that of the oppressed, or slave. 
Each of the perspectives must in tum be understood on several differ-
ent levels of consciousness. The first is the fear of the slave. I begin 
here because it is the fear that is most apparent and because it is the 
fear that I know first hand-that I am experiencing at this moment. 
I am not certain where my answer is headed; that is, I have not 
thought through my entire argument prior to embarking upon my verbal 
response. But I am confident it is there. The words I speak are new to 
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me. It is almost as if I become aware of them for the first time as they are 
spoken. But the thoughts they embody are somehow familiar. It is 
because they are mine. I am searching for my answer, not that of the 
questioner. 
This is a sensation I have often experienced in teaching. A student 
poses a problem. I begin my answer certain of the theme, knowing that I 
understand what must be understood, but not sure how I will get there or 
precisely where I will be when I arrive. I am thinking out loud before an 
audience of eighty-five students. There are times when I conclude my 
answer with the sensation that I have listened appreciatively while some-
one else explains something I never understood before. 
All of this takes a great deal of time to write, but in my dream I feel 
it in its entirety in the time it takes me to speak my opening sentence. To 
repeat: "The first is the fear of the slave." I continue: 
This fear is experienced at three levels of consciousness. At the most 
immediate level, the slave fears the physical violence of the master. It is 
a violence that may be experienced in many ways: that he will feel the 
cut of the overseer's lash, or that men in white sheets will come in the 
night and hang and bum him, or that she and her family will be 
deprived of food and forced to starve, or that she will be beaten by her 
husband. At this level of consciousness, the slave does not understand 
the reason for the master's violence. The master is viewed as hateful, 
crazy, depraved, immoral. In the extreme, where the slave has been 
conditioned to self-hate, the slave may view the master's violence as 
justified. 
At the second level, the slave fears rejection. [This is the fear I 
experienced only moments ago. It is a fear with which I continue to 
struggle.] The fear is in response to a different form of oppression. 
The slave has been told and comes to believe that he is welcome in the 
master's house if only he can prove himself worthy of admission. He 
feels secure from the physical violence of the whip and the lynch mob. 
Now he fears the emotional violence of being deemed inadequate, or 
not being accepted by the master. This fear, like the fear of the bat-
tered wife or the god-fearing peasant, is even more debilitating than the 
fear of the irrational whip because the injury is internalized and, in 
part, self-inflicted. 
At the third level, the slave no longer fears rejection because he 
now understands the cause of the violence he has experienced at the 
two previous levels. He has discovered the sham of white supremacy 
and the divine right of kings and social Darwinism. He has no respect 
for those who reject him. He understands that they are not superior, 
but more than that he begins to suspect that their need to do violence 
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to him is evidence of their inferiority. Again, the slave fears physical 
violence from the master, but this time because he understands its 
source. If the master suspects his comprehension, the master will 
strike out in a desperate effort to maintain the master's ill-gotten 
status. 
As I verbalize this thought, I feel myself somewhere between the 
second and third level. Will the master dismiss my analysis as "intellec-
tually inadequate," as "unsupported by documented evidence," as fur-
ther proof of my "lack of qualifications"? Will I believe him and accept 
and internalize his judgment? Or will he recognize that I have discov-
ered his charade and act it out one more time, mouthing the argument of 
"inadequacy," "incompetence," and "lack of qualification" while black-
listing me as "dangerous" behind the scenes? Will he see that I have 
understood too well and inflict violence by denying me the resources of 
academia or access to its forums of communication? 
I press on, despite my fears, with the sense of exhilaration and fatal-
ism that one experiences in battle. Perhaps I have the skill to walk the 
tightrope, to tell just enough of the truth to be bought out instead of 
wiped out. But that can only result in continued enslavement. I am still 
in the midst of improvisation. The theme is within me but I do not know 
the final chord. Like Dr. J. in midflight, I do not know until the shot is 
made whether it will be a slam dunk or a reverse lay-up off the glass. 
My answer continues: 
From the perspective of the master, there are also three levels of 
fear. The first level is the fear that the ignorant slave will rise up and 
kill him. Because he believes in the myth he has created-the myth of 
his own superiority over the slave-the violence he fears is an irra-
tional animal violence. If the oppressed fear him and hate him, it is 
because they do not understand their proper place. It is because they 
have been misled into thinking they are capable of independence. 
The second level of fear experienced by the master is the fear that 
he will be found out by the slave-that the oppressed will discover the 
sham of a meritocracy wherein the master defines that which consti-
tutes merit. He fears that when the slave discovers that the master's 
superior position is ill-gotten, he will rise up in revolt. This is a greater 
fear than the first because the rational violence of the human being is 
more certain than the irrational violence of the animal. 
The third level of fear experienced by the master is the fear of self-
discovery. He fears that in the slave's challenge to the slave system, 
he, the master, will be brought face-to-face with his own image; that he 
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will be confronted with his own insecurity and inadequacy; that he will 
understand that his need to define others as inferior and treat them as 
such springs from his own feelings of inferiority. He fears that his shell 
game is all that he has-that he is nothing without the slave. 
Finally, I realize that the ultimate fear of the slave and the master 
are the same. Each is forced to confront his solitariness in the world. 
Each is compelled to accept responsibility for who he or she is. 
The dream ends. I do not know my protagonist's response. It no 
longer matters. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is an exploration of vocational aspirations and efforts. 
It is an appendix to the brief contained in my dream-an account of my 
continuing efforts to respond to my interrogator's challenge and, more 
importantly, to the challenge posed by the insight of the dream, the chal-
lenge to take responsibility for who I am and what I do about my fears 
and those of the master. I reflect on what I do as a law teacher/scholar 
and why I do it. I describe the work to which I aspire as a scholar, citing 
the exemplary work of those I strive to emulate. I also tell the story of 
my work as a teacher and how my vision of that work has been formed. 
I hope that this essay is more than a self-indulgent, self-justifying exer-
cise; that there will be those who will share my experiences and aspira-
tions; and that there will be others who will benefit by my attempt to 
better understand and articulate what I value and how I try to pursue 
those values as a law professor. My motive for engaging in this intro-
spective effort is to begin to frame a paradigm for other scholars of color 
to build upon and critique. A more modest goal for this model is that it 
serve as a standard by which I may evaluate my own work. 
In Part III, I describe the genesis of this Article. My initial efforts 
at a comprehensive articulation of my ambitions as a teacher and scholar 
were occasioned by a panel presentation on minority scholarship to stu-
dents at Stanford and by a faculty seminar, in which I engaged several 
colleagues in a conversation about the substance and evolution of my 
race discrimination law course. I summarize the content of these conver-
sations, setting forth the elements of the model that will be discussed in 
the remainder of the Article. I relate the experience of discovering the 
inextricable relationship of my roles as teacher, scholar, and political 
activist. This discovery lies at the center of the model for my work. It is 
the starting point of this Article. My immodesty in calling what I 
describe a "model" is related to another discovery: The model is not 
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new. It is rooted in a well-established tradition among black teacher/ 
scholar/activists. I have only discovered a tradition of which I am a 
part. 
Part IV, the remainder of the Article, explains each of the elements 
or characteristics of this model or tradition. I call these elements "gifts." 
In so doing it is my intention to convey their intrinsic value as liberating 
intellectual weapons, to locate their source outside of the individual prac-
titioner and in the community of those who have experienced racial 
oppression, and to say that it is in the nature of the work required by the 
model that it be donated or returned to the community from whence it 
came. I discuss four talents that serve the teacher/scholar/activist who 
works in this tradition and note how and why each is a valuable gift. In 
each of these four subsections I relate how the gift is exemplified in Afri-
can-American scholarship and draw upon examples of how the gift can 
be employed in teaching. I also consider, in each of these subsections, 
the resistance that each aspect of the work encounters in the legal 
academy. 
III. THE GENESIS OF THE ARTICLE: REFLECTING ON 
WHAT I/WE THINK ABOUT AND DO 
A. TALKING TO STUDENTS ABOUT BEING A SCHOLAR 
[W]hat is the role of the word-the spoken word, the preached 
word, the whispered-in-the-nighttime word, the written word, the pub-
lished word-in the fight for black freedom?2 
A group of students at Stanford have asked me to speak on minority 
scholarship and I have begun my presentation with this quote from 
There Is a River,3 Vincent Harding's compelling and inspirational history 
of black radicalism in America. I have told the panel's organizers that I 
am neither willing nor able to attempt even a cursory description of the 
multifaceted work of my colleagues of color, but that I would be glad to 
ruminate on my own work as well as my aspirations for that work. I 
have recently assigned several chapters from Harding's book to one of 
my classes, and his portrayal of the tradition of "radical teaching among 
dominated African peoples,,4 has given focus to my reflections concern-
ing my own scholarship. 
2. VINCENT HARDING, THERE Is A RIVER 82 (1981). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 86. 
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I feel an immediate kinship with the tradition that Harding 
describes and names "the Word."s It is a tradition of teaching, preach-
ing, and healing; an interdisciplinary tradition wherein healers are con-
cerned with the soul and preachers with the pedagogy of the oppressed;6 
a tradition that eschews hierarchy in the face of the need for all of us who 
seek liberation to be both teachers and students. The Word is an articu-
lation and validation of our common experience. It is a vocation of 
struggle against dehumanization, a practice of raising questions about 
reasons for oppression, an inheritance of passion and hope. 
By contrast I am struck by the strong sense of alienation that I have 
felt from the role of "scholar." Some of this may be self-deprecation, a 
lingering self-doubt about whether I am up to playing the part.7 But I 
sense that the primary source of my resistance to this role lies in the 
question of whether the character of this tradition is in direct opposition 
to that of the Word. The scholar is "objective." He views his work as a 
value-free inquiry, an effort to clarify the world rather than to change it. 
He is guided by an orthodoxy that equates objectivity with emotional 
disengagement, cognitive distance, and moral indifference. 8 It is the 
work of those who remain cool and distant in the face of suffering or 
anger because it is not their liberation, their humanity, which is at stake.9 
I tell my audience that my talk will be a brief account of what I 
strive to do in my work. It will be an account of aspirations: a descrip-
tion of my efforts to join this tradition and to begin to frame a paradigm 
for its praxis in legal academia. I briefly outline the elements of this 
paradigmatic work-the special gifts that people of color bring to our 
work, the ingredients that give it special character. In this initial effort I 
borrow generously from Professor Mari Matsuda's richly insightful 
piece, We the People: Jurisprudence in Color,IO in which she notes that 
our work "is grounded in the particulars of a social reality that is 
5. Id. at 82. 
6. My family history is populated by men and women who were teaching, preaching, and 
healing activists. For an account of this history, see SARA LAWRENCE LIGHTFOOT, BALM IN GIL-
EAD: JOURNEY OF A HEALER (1988). 
7. See supra note 1. In noting my occasional discomfort in the role of scholar, I want to be 
certain to distinguish my position from those who have of late achieved great notoriety by arguing 
that they have been harmed by the stigmatization of affirmative action programs. See. e.g., STEPHEN 
L. CARTER. REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); SHELBY STEELIl, THE CON-
TENT OF OUR CHARACTER (1990). 
8. See RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
(1989). 
9. See infra part IV. 
10. Mari J. Matsuda, Address Before the American Association of Law Schools, Minority 
Section (Jan. 9, 1988) (transcript on file with author). 
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described by the experiences of people of color."II The work is "con-
sciously historical and revisionist."12 It recognizes the subjectivity of 
perspective and the need to tell stories that have not been told and that 
are not being told. Our voices and the voices of our parents and grand-
parents are valuable not just because they tell a different story, but 
because as outsiders we are able to see more clearly that what we see is 
not all that can be seen. 
But we are not wholly outsiders, and I remind myself and the stu-
dent audience that the burden of belonging and not belonging that is part 
of being black in AmericaI3-the duality of a heritage of slave foremoth-
ers and slave-master forefathers-is also a gift, a talent that must be 
engendered in our work. I4 This burden/gift of dual SUbjectivity enables 
those who bear it to recognize and articulate social realities that are 
unseen by those who live more fully within the world of privilege. IS But 
our duality can also be experienced as disabling when the seduction of 
privileged status or internalization of insider values threatens to subvert 
the Word's liberating insight. 
Finally, I note that our scholarship must strive to be both pragmatic 
and utopian. Our work must respond to the immediate needs of the 
oppressed and subordinated. I6 Education must involve both action and 
reflection. Theory must be informed by active struggle, and in tum it 
must inform that struggle. But we are also keepers of the dream. We are 
gifted by an ability to imagine a different world-to offer alternative val-
ues-if only because we are not inhibited by the delusion that we are well 
served by the status quoY 
None of this is new to me, but the students have forced me to articu-
late what my work is and what I would like it to be. The process of 
having to describe the nature of my "scholarly agenda" has been 
extremely helpful. It is not just that I have been forced to clarify my 
thoughts; more importantly, the articulation is a reaffirmation. It has 
served me well to name this work that is so important to me, to describe 
11. [d. at 1. 
12. [d. 
13. See W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 16-17 (1922). 
14. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 6 (1991) (discussing 
"purposeful doublevoicedness"). 
15. See Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987). 
16. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987). 
17. Matsuda, supra note 10, at 2 (stating that "the hopeful part of the description offered by 
outsider theorists is the recognition of the vulnerability of racist structures"). 
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its parts, and to explain why I value it. The seeds of this paper lie in this 
self-affirming experience. 
B. TALKING TO COLLEAGUES ABOUT How I TEACH 
Shortly after the panel on scholarship I am given an opportunity to 
carefully consider another aspect of my work. A group of my colleagues 
has been meeting on a regular basis to develop a coordinated set ofread-
ings and courses for students interested in preparing themselves to work 
with subordinated people.18 I have been asked to talk about my course 
Racism and American Law. The course has evolved rapiqly in recent 
years, and once again I find myself forced to find words for ideals, objec-
tives, and strategies that I have been improvising in the midst of the pres-
sures of class preparation and teaching and without the lUXUry of 
deliberate contemplation. The careful cross-examination by my col-
leagues helps me to concretely conceptualize aspects of my teaching that 
are largely intuitive. Again, this initial effort is cursory, only suggesting 
themes that are central to my pedagogical aspirations. 
In its early incarnations my course on race discrimination law was 
in some respects a traditional civil rights law course. My chief goal was 
to hook students on the idea of becoming civil rights lawyers and to start 
them down the road to becoming good ones. It was primarily a how-to 
course. We gave more careful consideration to race cases they had stud-
ied in constitutional law, with an eye toward creative manipulation of 
existing doctrine. I introduced my students to the federal and state stat-
utes that would become the staple of their civil rights practices, and I 
assigned written and oral exercises designed to teach lawyering skills. 
We talked a good deal about the real-life experience of the parties to the 
cases and our own potential clients. We noted the values manifested in 
the cases and statutes and explored the values that prompted our interest 
in becoming legal activists. 
What made the course different from many other civil rights courses 
was its instructor and its primary text. In 1974, I was one of a too-small 
18. The proposed curriculum, Lawyering for Social Change, will give students intensive train-
ing in the theory and practice of representing the politically and socially subordinated. The curricu-
lum would begin in the second semester of the first year of law study, with courses on basic 
lawyering skills and on subordination itself. The content of the latter courses 
would be drawn from (1) political, social, and economic theory on how and why some 
groups are disadvantaged; (2) literature-autobiography, fiction, oral testimony, drama, 
poetry, and so forth-expressing 'the experience of that form of living and life'; and (3) 
observations by people in allied efforts, such as social workers, organizers and lay people. 
Innovative Academic Courses, 40 STAN. LAW. 40, 42 (1989). 
1992] THE WORD AND THE RIVER 2241 
group of persons of color teaching law. Civil rights courses were almost 
as rare as black professors, and most of them were taught by white 
professors. From the start I used my friend Derrick Bell's book Race 
Racism and American Law.19 This book of cases and materials was a 
groundbreaking effort at exploring the role of law in creating and reme-
dying racial injustice. (It remains, along with Bell's second edition, a 
unique effort.) It manifested both Bell's critical skepticism about the 
achievements of civil rights law and his commitment to using the law as a 
vehicle for social change. Professor Bell's "racism hypos" added an 
important pedagogical contribution to this significant piece of scholar-
ship. These hypothetical legal problems required students to develop 
creative and novel legal arguments, outside the scope of existing doctrine, 
sufficiently powerful to win redress for racial injuries. The hypotheticals 
provoked discussions that forced both teacher and student to reflect upon 
the connections among the intellectual, political, and emotional aspects 
of race and law. 
Two recurring dilemmas presented themselves during the early 
years of teaching this course. One was a methodological problem and the 
other a substantive one; each pushed my teaching in the same direction. 
The methOdological problem was straightforward and familiar. There 
was simply too much to teach. The substantive legal doctrine was mas-
sive, complex, and rapidly changing. Introducing the basic doctrine, 
carefully analyzing that doctrine, and putting the doctrine into context 
via a brief introduction to the wealth of literature from the social sciences 
were all time-consuming. Training in lawyering skills is also intensive 
and time-consuming. Finally, one cannot talk about race in America 
without addressing the personal experience, feelings, and values of class 
participants.2o 
The substantive problem posed an even more serious challenge. In 
1974, when I first taught this course, the story I told my students was one 
of a difficult but victorious legal battle. Despite the Burger Court there 
was reason for optimism among those engaged in civil rights litigation.21 
But each succeeding year brought new Supreme Court decisions that 
19. DERRICK BELL, RACE RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1973). For years I called this 
course Derrick's course and still think of it that way despite his more recent adoption of my peda-
gogical method. 
20. Law school teachers typically respond to these pedagogical problems by avoiding them. 
We select a small universe of substantive materials, leave skills training to law firms and clinics, and 
avoid issues of experience, feelings, and values by declaring them irrelevant, beyond the scope of our 
professional interest and expertise, or even counterproductive to the task of training lawyers. 
21. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 
(1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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made my message less hopeful and more bleak.22 I was often tempted to 
encourage my students by explaining a new and horrible decision as an 
aberration-by suggesting that it was the product of a poor litigation 
strategy or of the Supreme Court majority's faulty understanding of 
sound doctrine. But these explanations were unsatisfactory and dishon-
est. I soon abandoned them in favor of an approach that encouraged 
students to see developing civil rights doctrine as the natural and foresee-
able product of an enterprise whose function it was to maintain funda-
mental patterns of race and class in American society. 
Alan Freeman's brilliant piece of doctrinal deconstruction, Legiti-
mizing Racism Through Antidiscrimination Law,23 was a cornerstone text 
in my course. It argued persuasively and with considerable documenta-
tion that even those cases that seemed to advance the cause of minorities 
served an ideology that promoted racist and class-based structures.24 
Derrick Bell's second edition of Race Racism and American Law 
appeared two years after the Freeman article. It too was impatient with 
legal doctrine, seriously challenging the liberal myth that the civil rights 
struggle has been a long and slow but always progressing march toward 
full equality. Professor Bell argued that when blacks were successful it 
was only because their interests happened to coincide with those of pow-
erful whites.25 This approach to the doctrine served to assuage my con-
science and brought with it the benefits of speaking truth, but it also 
presented serious pedagogical problems. If the truth appeared to be so 
hopeless and the pursuit of legal remedies counterproductive, what was I 
doing teaching this stuff? 
22. See, e.g., Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
23. Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racism Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review 0/ 
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978). 
24. Freeman later summarized his argument as follows: 
In [Legitimizing Racism Through Antidiscrimination Law], I argued that civil rights law 
for the twenty-five years since the Brown case has served more to rationalize the continued 
effects of racial discrimination than to promote any genuine liberation from a history of 
oppression. Those developments led me to conclude that the process by which the law 
absorbed the civil rights struggle, reprocessed it, and turned it out in recent cases is in some 
fashion a part of what may be called the legitimation process. Today's legal ideology pre-
tends in many ways that racism has been cured, that the problem has been dealt with, that 
we can go on to other problems, that the legal rights that have been created amount to 
sufficient equality or liberation for formerly oppressed people. To call those ideas ideology 
is to contend that their content masks rather than aecords with reality as we experience it. 
Alan Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE L.l. 1880, 1893-94 
(1981) (reviewing Derrick Bell's Race Racism and American Law). 
25. See Derrick Bell, Brown vs. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
1992] THE WORD AND THE RIVER 2243 
I did not have a ready answer to this question. Nor did Alan Free-
man, who had posed a similar query in a thoughtful review of Bell's new 
book.26 I turned to my students, employing the well-worn professor's 
ruse of anticipating the students' most difficult question by posing it to 
them. It was this act of desperation that marked the advent of my pur-
suit of the pedagogical paradigm that is the subject of this paper. 
In 1983, while teaching my course as a visiting professor at Stan-
ford, I began by assigning Freeman's article and candidly explaining to 
students the nature of my dilemma. I was hoping that they could help 
me find the ways to help them become effective advocates for liberation 
while living and working within institutions and cultures that appeared 
hell-bent on perpetuating racist domination. I asked them to keep Free-
man's challenge in mind as they approached the readings, exercises, and 
discussions throughout the course. 
I did have some intuitions of my own that suggested ways of chang-
ing my approach to teaching these materials, ways that might help free 
us from our sense of powerlessness and frustration in the face of debilitat-
ing doctrine and ideology. I thought that an important first step might 
be to find a way to get students to think more expansively about what it 
means to be a civil rights lawyerP It was fairly obvious that if the courts 
were becoming less receptive to legal arguments that advanced the cause 
of civil rights, we should look for other venues in which to press our case. 
But what was called for was more than a change of institutional forum. 
If retrenchment in the federal courts was a reflection of political climate 
or predictable historical forces, it would not suffice to go to Congress, 
administrative agencies, state courts, or state legislatures with the same 
arguments. We had to imagine how best to create change in the political 
climate. Contemplating methods likely to effect such change required 
that we reevaluate not only our image of the appropriate role for lawyers 
but also our image of ourselves and our relation to the dominant culture. 
I took my first steps in implementing this methodology with some 
trepidation. My students had invested a good deal of time and energy in 
learning to "think like a lawyer" and to value the mode of thought, the 
professional role, and the self-image that characterize traditional lawyer-
ing. I was not at all certain that my students would respond well to a 
26. Freeman, supra note 23, at 1066. 
27. My own peripatetic professional story reflects an ongoing struggle with this question. I 
have moved from legal services lawyer to school principal/community organizer to public interest 
lawyer engaged primarily in impact litigation to law teacher/scholar/activist, always searching for 
the best way to match my inclinations, talents, and limitations with the struggle's needs. 
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pedagogical approach that encouraged them to place less stock in these 
hard-earned prerogatives. I began by introducing a simulation that 
would extend throughout the course of the semester. The simulation 
divided the class into seven groups of five students each. Each group was 
assigned to represent a specific interest group or constituency within the 
minority community.28 Students were asked to think of themselves in 
the role of an attorney who had volunteered to work with clients to 
determine how the client group might best effectuate needed social 
change.29 The simulation was divided into two stages. In the first stage, 
the students assessed the client group's current position in the political 
arena and the effectiveness of existing legislation, judicial precedent, and 
administrative remedies available to the constituency they represented.30 
In the second stage, each group mapped out a proposed long-term strat-
egy, including a list of short-term goals and specific activities its members 
planned in pursuit of those goalS.31 
28. The groups included blacks in major urban areas (National Conference of Black Mayors); 
national civil rights organizations (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
Urban League, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund); Jesse Jackson Presidential Campaign; 
Congressional Black Caucus; Latino organizations (Mexican American Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, League of United Latin American Citizens, Puerto Rican Defense Fund); Leadership 
Conference for Civil Rights (an old-line coalition of blacks, women, labor, and Jewish civil rights 
organizations); Black Women Organized for Political Action (black women affiliated with NOW). 
Memorandum from Charles R. Lawrence, III, to students in Race Relations Law class, Stanford 
Law School 3 (on file with author). 
29. Your task will be to determine what strategies for legal reform will best serve the 
interests of the group you represent and then to come together with the rest of the class to 
formulate a common strategy. Your approach should be political in the broadest sense. 
That is, you should explore the viability of all possible avenues for change including litiga-
tion, negotiation, legislation, self help, political education, economic sanctions, demonstra-
tions, etc. Your work should involve the identification of critical barriers or elements of 
resistance to change as well as possible sources of coalition and support. You should also 
identify those issues which may create conflict among segments of the minority 
community. 
ld. at 3-4. 
30. Your task during this stage will be to gather sufficient information about the group to 
which you have been assigned to describe its current position in the political arena: Who is 
its constituency? How has the law improved its position with respect to access to the 
political process? What appear to be the most important barriers which still remain? 
What are its goals? What are the key issues they would like to see addressed? What are its 
major resources and liabilities? 
ld. at 4. ' 
31. You should also note where you 'anticipate the greatest resistance, where you antici-
pate support, the resources you anticipate will be at your disposal, where you think 
resources must be developed, supporting precedent where litigation is considered, political 
allies where legislation or administrative action' is considered, legal and organizational 
impediments where direct action is considered. If possible, the specific activities you pro-
pose should have some internal consistency or be reflective of some more general theorY of 
social change or view of the nature of American race relations. 
ld. at 5. ' • 
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In a memorandum describing the simulation I indicated that this 
exercise was designed to simulate a process by which lawyers concerned 
with the struggle for racial equality in America might work as a group to 
develop long- and short-term strategies for legal reform. I told the stu-
dents that I hoped to broaden their perspective of how individuals with 
legal skills might contribute to the process of social change and political 
and legal reform.32 I said that it was also my intent to respond, in part, 
to Professor Freeman's characterization of Professor Bell's impatience 
with legal doctrine as "despairing." While I did not want to minimize in 
any way the harsh reality of American race relations or the legal estab-
lishment's role as a handmaiden of racial oppression, I did think that 
such a realization counseled us to seek alternatives to reliance on legal 
doctrine rather than simply throwing up our hands in despair or adopt-
ing an attitude of self-righteous radical chic. As my third purpose I 
stated my desire to have them "experience and reflect upon the emotions 
(anger, guilt, frustration, hope, ambivalence, etc.) that accompany the 
pursuit of lofty ideals or strongly held commitments within a system 
where neither one's ultimate goals nor the emotions one experiences in 
their pursuit are highly valued.'>33 
I asked each group to keep a detailed account of internal group pro-
cess by appointing an individual to record what went on at group meet-
ings. Each student was also required to write two or three pages 
following each group meeting reflecting on his or her ideas, role in the 
group, and feelings evoked by both the process and the substantive issues 
discussed.34 The response to this simulation was overwhelmingly posi-
tive. Despite an early uneasiness and some grumbling about the open-
endedness and enormity of the task, students worked hard at it. Once 
they became convinced that I was more interested in what they could 
learn from the process than in a pretty product, they seemed to enjoy the 
exercise. More importantly, the simulation allowed them to view the 
limitations of the doctrine as a point of departure rather than as a 
despairing final chapter. Exploring alternative political strategies also 
32. Both the form and substance of much of our legal training tend to restrict our view of 
our appropriate role as lawyers. This exercise is intended to encourage you to explore a 
wide range of options for achieving social and political change and to consider the ways in 
which the lawyer's skills of analysis, adversarial argument, counseling, conflict resolution, 
negotiation, etc., can best be used to implement those options. 
[d. at 1. 
33. [d. 
34. This was my first use of reflection pieces, a pedagogical method that has become central to 
this course. 
2246 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:2231 
helped them see the potential for telling our stories to different audiences, 
in different forums, and in ways different from traditional legal discourse. 
I found that there were similar benefits to be gained by asking stu-
dents to consider the issues in Bell's hypotheticals from the perspective of 
nontraditional roles. Instead of asking students to prepare briefs and 
oral arguments for presentation to an appellate court, I asked them to 
prepare a presentation for a legislative committee, a community meeting, 
a high school class, or a dinner discussion with friends. When students 
assumed nonlawyer roles to discuss the issues presented in legal 
hypotheticals, several important things happened: 
1. Students were able to experience how the hierarchy of lawyer-
client relationships distorted both the lawyer's and the client's view of 
whether there had been an injury, how the injury had occurred, the strat-
egy for addressing that injury, and the appropriate remedy. They also 
experienced firsthand how this distortion was even more severe when the 
client was a poor or otherwise subordinated person.35 Thus, when stu-
dents were asked to assume the role of a good friend of a community 
board chair who had dropped by the house for drinks and coffee and just 
happened to be a lawyer, the discussions were much different from when 
students assumed the role of a lawyer representing the board in litigation. 
Students playing the role of the community board chair reported that the 
discussions with the "good friend" were also much more helpful. 36 
2. Students also discovered how significantly the law shaped the way 
they thought about human problems, how using dominant legal dis-
course or "thinking like a lawyer" caused them to devalue or deem irrele-
vant certain observations, feelings, ideas, and ideals that seemed 
important to them when they self-consciously assumed a nonlawyer's 
role.37 It also became apparent that more often than not these devalued 
aspects of their intelligence were those that they associated with their 
identities as members of oppressed or marginalized groups.38 
3. Students more easily recalled and related personal experience. 
They were also more effective and articulate in conveying these exper-
iences. This increased facility was directly related to my assigning value 
35. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
36. See supra notes 29-33. 
37. Id. 
38. In other words, what they experienced was not just a matter of form or technique, 
although this too was important. It was not that they were thinking more clearly as lawyers, but 
that they were making assumptions about the relevancy and importance and even the existence of 
things that they knew and understood. 
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to the experience and giving authority to the role. Creating a role that 
enabled them to play themselves, or some part of themselves, gave legiti-
macy to their subjective view. It made their positioned perception rele-
vant and important to the task of determining how best the law might 
describe and analyze the issues presented by the hypothetical. I often 
placed the hypothetical in a setting in which my students had been 
directly involved and then asked them to play themselves.39 When role-
playing exercises or simulations are brought closer to home, participants 
gain an additional benefit. Reflection is brought closer to praxis and stu-
dent/teachers may experience the liberation of giving authority to ideas 
by acting on them. 
In the years since 1983 I have moved steadily toward increasing the 
number of exercises and readings that encourage and legitimate the tell-
ing of students' stories. My materials surround cases and law review 
articles with narrative-with history, social science, and literature that 
makes no pretense to objectivity.40 The law remains, but we are always 
involved in testing its ability to incorporate and respond to our experi-
ence. Where the law fails we look for ways to create new analytic con-
structs that are more faithful to the reality we experience. We work to 
resist the inclination to think ourselves crazy and join the crowd in pro-
claiming the beauty of the emperor's new clothes. We struggle to find 
ways to be more articulate, more forceful, and more passionate in 
describing what we see so that others may share our vision. Bell's text 
has become a supplementary reading and his book of allegorical essays, 
And We Are Not Saved,41 is now required reading. 
In 1986 I began using a pedagogical method that has significantly 
improved the work I do with my students toward the promulgation of 
the Word.42 Each week students are required to write a brief essay 
recording their reactions to some portion of the readings for that week or 
to the impact of the readings as a whole. I ask that the students use these 
39. These included situations such as the discussion of a racial issue at the family dinner table, 
a conversation with the provost or dean at an informal university reception or in the context of 
negotiating student demands, an interview with a judge or hiring partner, a discussion with room-
mates about an incident that had occurred in school, etc. 
40. Charles R. Lawrence, III, Syllabus for Constitutional Law: Critical Race Perspectives 
(Fall 1991) (on file with Southern California Law Review). 
41. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
(1987). 
42. A number of law teachers have adopted this technique and reported beneficial results. See 
BELL, supra note 19; Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 
CAL. L. REv. 1511, 1546 (1991); Patricia Caine, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listen-
ing to Difference and Exploring Connection, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 165, 168 (1988). 
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essays, which I call reflection pieces, as a vehicle for reporting gut reac-
tions or feelings evoked by the readings. I tell them that I do not want 
legal analysis. Reflection pieces are due the day before the class meets. I 
read them, make comments on most, and refer to them during the class, 
often selecting a few to read in part or in full.43 
Reflection pieces serve several purposes. Students come to class pre-
pared. But more than that, they come having already engaged in the 
process of experiencing the harmony or dissonance between their own 
perspectives and the perspectives described in the readings. The assign-
ment privileges experience and the forceful articulation of that experi-
ence. Each week I am newly impressed by the thoughtfulness of these 
pieces. I am struck by their honesty, by my students' willingness to risk 
making themselves vulnerable, and by ~lieir bravery in their criticism of 
my manifested bias or myopia as well as that of the cases or the authors 
assigned. The power of these pieces is not just in their usefulness as a 
method for discovering new insights gained from a diversity of experi-
ence and perspective, but in the authority they give to the voices of those 
who have come to experience themselves as lacking authority. 
This student-centered, student-generated pedagogical method is 
what I describe to my colleagues who have asked to hear about my 
teaching. 
c. UNDERSTANDING THAT PREACHING AND PRACTICE ARE ONE 
Within the Word we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in 
such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed-even in part-the 
other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not at the 
same time a praxis.44 
This rambling and disconnected conversation with my colleagues 
about my race discrimination course produces the same self-affirming 
results as did my talk with students about my scholarship. But it is the 
juxtaposition of these two conversations that is most enlightening. As I 
talk with colleagues about dialogue with my students, it becomes clear to 
me that all of these conversations are critical to what I have been striving 
to comprehend and articulate about my scholarship, about the Word. It 
43. I tell students that I want them to feel free to say things in their reflection pieces that they 
may not be prepared to share with the entire class. I ask that they write "DO NOT SHARE" at the 
top of the piece or indicate any portion of the piece that they do not wish to share. I assure them 
that these portions of their writing will remain confidential. I have found that offering this option 
not only allows students to share things with me when they are not prepared to go pUblic, it frees 
students to be more candid in what they do share. 
44. PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 75 (1982). 
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is evident to me that the Word requires a unity of pedagogy and scholar-
ship, and that I cannot, I should not, separate methodology from sub-
stance or objective. This was not a new idea to me; I had heard it from 
others and nodded my head in agreement.45 I had even been a practi-
tioner of this ideal, probably more so than most. But this was nonethe-
less a "eureka" type of experience. This was a way of understanding 
what might enable me to transmit my experience to others. 
If the role of the Word includes its use and value as a unifying force, 
a statement of protest, an expression of courage, an organizing tool, the 
articulation of utopian dreams or a higher law, then our methodology 
must inspire and advance those uses and values. If the nature of the 
Word is that it is subjective, consciously historical, and revisionist; if it is 
both pragmatic (responding to the immediate necessities of survival and 
struggle) and poetic (responding to the immediate need of expression of 
feeling); if it must proceed from the specifics of experience and articula-
tion of that experience toward the abstraction of theory; if it is reflection 
on action, informed by active struggle and in tum informing that strug-
gle; if it is double voiced, expressing the ambiguity of those who know 
the experience of belonging and not belonging, then our methodology 
must be a vehicle designed to carry out these complex and varied tasks. 
Our way of speaking the Word, of gathering the Word, of spreading the 
Word, must be open. It must be a form that admits all comers, that does 
not have a dress code or a requirement that it be filed in triplicate. 
One of the ways I have experienced this necessary relationship 
between substance and methodology, between reflection and action, is 
through my teaching and the way my teaching informs my scholarship. 
In fact my teaching (in the broadest sense, my dialogue with others) is 
the chief source of nourishment for my scholarship. The Word is praxis, 
not just in the more obvious ways the thoughtful work of a scholar pro-
vides strategy or frames new conceptual arguments for the activist lawyer 
or community organizer, but in the ongoing work of the scholar as 
teacher. By speaking and hearing the Word in our classrooms, in our 
offices, or in community meetings we transform our own understanding 
of our relationship with the world and thereby transform the world. In 
my teaching about law I try to leave space for, to encourage and value, 
the articulation of feeling and experience. This is particularly important 
in teaching law, where the story that is told within the dominant dis-
course has systematically excluded the experience of people of color and 
45. See ROSALDO, supra note 8. 
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other outsiders and where we are trained to believe that the story told by 
those in power is a universal story. 
Every new and important understanding or insight that I have 
reached and found a way to articulate in my writing has come from dia-
logue with my students and with teachers. The conversations that pro-
duce theory are those that identify and articulate dissonance between 
existing legal theory and our individual/collective feeling and experience. 
Articulate descriptions of what we experience and feel must be placed 
alongside the descriptions produced by dominant theorists. Where there 
is discord or where there are notes missing in the law's written score, our 
conversations must be an improvisational search for notes that are har-
monious with the way we experience the world. 
Conversations, when they are real conversations, are open. They 
invite firsthand, subjective accounts of feeling and experience. These 
conversations must begin with our own stories, because unless we privi-
lege what we see, hear, and feel we may never hear the discord, or when 
we do hear it we may interpret it as some problem with our own sensibili-
ties. Our stories must be privileged because in the dominant discourse 
they have either been unheard or, when they have been heard, 
devalued.46 
This Article contains two stories that are inspired by the experience 
of having begun to tell them to my students and colleagues at the schol-
arship panel and in the curriculum workshop. These two stories, of 
scholarship and pedagogy, are actually one. They are united in the Word 
by an ethos of liberatory activism. In Part IV of this Article I explore in 
more detail the characteristics that describe these two intersecting parts 
of the paradigm of the Word.47 
46. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. 
PA. L. REv. 561 (analyzing the citation practices of mainstream civil rights scholars and finding that 
most ignore the work of scholars of color); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to 
Marginalize Outsider Writing. Ten Yean Later, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1992) (updating earlier 
argument on the same subject and noting that things have not changed significantly in the years 
since); Jerome M. Culp, Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White Authority in the 
Legal Academy, 1992 DUKE L.J. 1095 (noting that Posner is dismissive of all minority scholarship 
and argues that it has made no contribution to the discourse in an article in which he fails to cite any 
of the work he demeans). 
47. While Part IV will focus on the elements of the Word as they are manifested in the scholar-
ship of its practitioners, I will also draw upon examples of pedagogy that serve to foster each of those 
elements. My treatment of this aspect of the Word is necessarily limited by the scope of this Article. 
I plan to explore my teaching more fully in a later article. For the moment, I hope that the examples 
I employ here will serve to further an understanding of the interrelationship of pedagogy and 
scholarship. 
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There is a third story in this Article. It is a story about resistance to 
the message and methods of the Word by those who dominate legal dis-
course-a story about the devaluation of this important work by the 
established legal academy. The Word and its would-be practitioners are 
too often met with hostility, belittlement, deprecation, disregard, and 
lack of understanding. I seek to clarify the objections that are voiced in 
criticism of and in opposition to this work. These objections are often 
expressed in neutral terms. The work is deemed unworthy, inappropri-
ate, or lacking in merit without reference to the pedagogical principles, 
the intellectual ideology, or the political and moral vision that inform 
those judgments. By articulating the values that cause us to hold this 
work in high esteem and those that cause others to think it of little 
worth, I hope to make explicit what is at stake for all of us, to make 
explicit the norms that are contained in the white male academy's evalu-
ation of scholarship, and to argue that the alternative values advanced by 
the Word will better serve us all. This story is intended as a brief to my 
white colleagues in support of hiring, promoting, and learning from prac-
titioners of the Word. But, more importantly, it is a message to my 
brothers and sisters that what they are doing is good and important, that 
there are others of us who understand the immense day-by-day effort 
required by this work, and that this work must be done whether it is 
valued by the dominant white academy or not.48 
IV. THE GIFTS OF THE WORD: A PARADIGM FOR 
SCHOLAR/TEACHERS 
In this part of the Article I return to each of the elements or charac-
teristics of the paradigm that I have called the Word and explore more 
fully how it expresses itself in both scholarship and pedagogy. In so 
doing I will refer to the work of exemplary scholars, artists, teachers, and 
activists, keeping in mind my earlier observation that the Word eschews 
any segregation of these roles. I begin by focusing on that part of the 
Word that would be called scholarship in the dominant academic cul-
ture. This is that part of our work that manifests itself in a formal writ-
ten product.49 
48. This story of the resistance to the Word, like the story of pedagogy, deserves more atten-
tion than I can give it in this introductory Article. Here, resistance to the Word will be addressed 
primarily in footnotes. I plan to tell this story in a more complete form in the future. 
49. I believe that this written product is only one form of reflection on and articulation of the 
understandings that nourish and are nourished by teaching, art, and activism. For a discussion of 
several ways the Word is manifested in the work of one law professor, see Charles Lawrence, III, 
Doing "The James Brown" at Harvard: Professor Derrick Bell as Liberationist Teacher, 8 HARv. 
BLACKLETIER J. 263 (1991). 
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A. THE GIFT OF IDENTITY: EMBRACING SUBJECTIVITY 
A self-conscious commitment to a sUbjective perspective is critical 
to the work of practitioners of the Word. I will consider three separate, 
although interrelated, meanings that may be given to the term "subjec-
tive" that enable and are central to our scholarship. These meanings are 
the following: 1) subjective, indicating the scholars' positioned perspec-
tive in viewing and recording social constructs, 2) subjective, indicating 
nonneutrality of purpose, that the scholar embraces certain values and 
that her work is avowedly political (read liberationist), 3) subjectivity, 
indicating that the scholar places herself in the linguistic position of sub-
ject rather than object, a being capable of acting upon the world rather 
than as one upon whom others act. 
1. Subjectivity as Positioned Perspective 
Most legal academics aspire to the classical scholarly paradigm of 
the detached, objective observer/recorder. This model envisions scholars 
achieving an unbiased and universal perspective by distancing themselves 
from the social reality they seek to describe.50 The Word, in stark con-
trast, embraces positioned perspective. It recognizes the impossibility of 
distance and impartiality in the observation of a play in which the 
observers must also be actors.51 But championing SUbjectivity is more 
50. This model is exemplified by the tension traditional legal scholars perceive between teach-
ing students to be professional advocates and the scholarly enterprise of discovering "truth." See, 
e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 
968 (1981) ("The essential difference between scholarship and advocacy should now be clear: 
whereas the latter is indifferent to truth in that it does not regard the discovery of truth as something 
valuable for its own sake, the former has the apprehension and expression of the truth as its internal, 
constitutive goal.") Renato Rosaldo has noted that the Weberian tradition legitimized scholarship 
that attempts, in the name of value-free inquiry, to clarify the world rather than to change it, but 
that Weber's successors have bastardized the original demanding ethic of "disinterestedness," trans-
forming it into an orthodoxy that equates objectivity with an attitude of emotional disengagement, 
cognitive distance, and moral indifference. ROSALDO, supra note 8. 
51. Acknowledging the inevitability of positioned perspective has gained increased legitimacy 
in the social sciences, see generally PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND HUMAN SCIENCE 208 
(1981) (arguing that in the same way that text exists beyond the intent of the author and gains new 
meaning with the interpretive effort of every reader, "hUman deeds are also waiting for fresh inter-
pretations which decide their meaning"); among critics of art and literature, see, e.g., LINDA 
HUTCHEON, A POETICS OF POSfMODERNISM: HISTORY, THEORY, AcnON (1988); and even among 
legal scholars. But the continuing novelty of and resistance to this idea is expressed by mainstream 
scholars who continue to claim objectivity in their own work and suggest that the work of minorities 
and feminists is less valid because of their closeness to the subject matter. The relative novelty of 
Martha Minow's Justice Engendered and my cultural meaning test are also evidence of the law's 
reluctance to accept the value of positioned perspective. See Minow, supra note 15; Charles R. 
Lawrence, III, The [d, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 317 (1987). See also Kronman, supra note 50 (noting that a law professor's perspective on 
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than an acknowledgement of the existence and validity of many different 
and competing perspectives. 52 Practitioners of the Word must learn to 
privilege their own perspectives and those of other outsiders, understand-
ing that the dominant legal discourse is premised upon the claim to 
knowledge of objective truths and the existence of neutral principles. We 
must free ourselves from the mystification produced by this ideology. 
We must learn to trust our own senses, feelings, and experiences and give 
them authority, even (or especially) in the face of dominant accounts of 
social reality that claim universality. 
"Universal" accounts are particularly pernicious when the assertion 
of universality is left unstated, as is most often the case. 53 An exchange 
between two colleagues, one a white male and the other a woman of 
color, demonstrates both the oppressive power of the unstated, universal-
ized premise and the liberating power of the outsider's ability to give her 
own positioned perspective authority. 
The faculty group to which I had presented my thoughts on teach-
ing and my race discrimination class was also developing a curriculum 
for lawyering for social change. We were now in our second semester of 
regular meetings. 54 Two of my colleagues had taken on the burdensome 
and thankless task of assembling materials for the group to read and dis-
cuss in a seminar format. 55 The third set of readings included a series of 
articles discussing I.Q. and theories about its relationship to race and 
poverty. The articles were highly technical "scientific" pieces and, with 
the exception of a chapter from Stephen Jay Gould's The Mismeasure of 
Man, were all by "neoconservative" authors. 56 The cover memorandum 
attached to the materials read as follows: 
moral instruction is different from that of a student). But see generally Ronald Dworkin, Law as 
Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527 (1982), reprinted in THE POLmcs OF INTERPRETATION 249 
eN. Mitchell ed., 1983) (advancing an interpretivist view). 
52. A chief criticism of Minow's otherwise brilliant piece is that it is not sufficiently explicit 
about the relationship between power and perspective. 
53. See Minow, supra note 15, at 50-54. 
54. See supra part II1.B. 
55. There were widely differing perceptions within the group about whether these first sets of 
materials were being offered as proposed course materials or whether we were simply using them for 
purposes of self -education, covering the range of literature that might be important in a foundation 
course for such a curriculum. There was, however, consensus that we were discussing the materials 
for the purpose of determining their efficacy as pedagogical tools in such a course. 
56. The materials included excerpts from Mark Snyderman & S. Rothman, Science, Politics 
and the IQ Controversy, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1986, at 79; Frank L. Schmidt, Can Measurement 
Technology Solve the Problem of Group Differences, (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); 
STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981); Bernard D. Davis, Neo-Lysenkoism, IQ 
and the Press, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1983, at 41; EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CiTY 
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We thought we'd begin by continuing the discussion on Marxism, 
focusing on the ReichlEdwards/Gordon material. I've attached a set 
of readings on "neoconservative" theory, not because they'd necessar-
ily come next in the actual course, but because they seem to pose a 
very different (but very powerful) set of pedagogical problems. Unlike 
the Marxist material (unfamiliar and difficult), these materials may 
seem quite familiar but quite offensive to a large number of the stu-
dents. I'd like to discuss that problem, as well as the substantive 
issues. 57 
Several days before we met to discuss these materials another mem-
ber of the working group, a black woman colleague, came by my office. 
She was upset and concerned about the readings, particularly by their 
format and the cover memo that accompanied them. I shared many of 
her concerns and encouraged her to draft a memorandum sharing them 
with the group. Although the memorandum, an eleven-page effort, is too 
long to quote in full here, the section that responded to the cover memo-
randum is most relevant to this discussion in that it demonstrates how 
outsiders can be liberated by embracing a positioned perspective. 
[T]here is a very small, subtle, perhaps unconscious but devastating 
frame contained in the cover memo to these materials. I refer to the 
language that these materials "may seem offensive." This is a laissez-
faire, open-ended throwaway that implies that the opinions expressed 
herein are just opinions and that all opinions are valid or equal. While 
this may be true in some ultimate sense, as reflecting the truth of the 
speaker's world, I thought we wanted, in this course, to have a more 
specific political agenda. 
It seems to me that an important shift of reference comes about 
when you assume not that some "might" be offended but that these 
ARE offensive because there are some who are not just offended, but 
powerful and visible enough to have that opinion extend itself as an 
attribute of the materials themselves. I am offended. Therefore, these 
materials are offensive. It is at this point that we can begin to have a 
discussion about why I am offended, about what it is in these materials 
that has the property of "offense-to-me." 
REVISITED (1979); George Gilder, The Col/apse of the American Family in Welfare's ''New Con-
sensus, " PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1987, at 20; Charles Murray, In Search of the Workillg Poor, PUD. 
INTEREST, Fall 1987, at 3; Martin Kilson, Black Social Classes and Intergelleratiolla/ Poverty, PUD. 
INTEREST, Summer 1981, at 58; Thomas Sowell, Black Excellence: The Case of Dunbar High 
School, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1974, at 3. 
57. Memorandum from "Your Conveners" to Lawyering for Social Change Work Group (Oct. 
10, 1988) (on file with author). 
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Any other stance, I think any other balance, allows the laziness of 
majoritarian opting out. The materials, because they "might" be offen-
sive to an invisible unnamed some, therefore take on the property of 
"might-being" a little bit offensive in small part. But because, after all, 
they only might be offensive, they could just as well take on the charac-
ter of being for the most part not offensive. It is thus that materials 
can get manipulated imagistically rather than analytically, as though 
the topic were something that could be decided by a simple vote. So if 
a majority of people enter the class feeling that their I.Q. is higher than 
that of Blacks, these readings, as presently constituted, will allow them 
to feel OK about that. Black inferiority is just one of several valid 
interpretations. And if most of the class is authorized to feel that way 
by the cues in the materials or in the presentation of them, then we 
have succeeded only in legitimating the status quo and in subordinat-
ing the already subordinated. S8 
"I am offended. Therefore, these materials are offensive." It is these 
words that are revolutionary. The author has done much more than 
offer a different perspective on the materials. She has given her/our per-
spective authority and in doing so has shown us that we can do the same. 
The unstated assertion of objectivity and universality in the materials and 
in their presentation is made explicit and challenged. It is unmasked and 
revealed as a perspective that advances values and goals inimical to our 
own. Thus, by embracing a positioned perspective, this gifted practi-
tioner of the Word reallocated the power to define what is reaP9 
In an analysis of the Mro-American autobiographical statement,6O 
Selwyn Cudjoe notes the intense regard for personal positioned perspec-
tive in the cultural tradition of American blacks. She quotes Harlem 
58. Memorandum from Patricia Williams to Law and Subordination Work Group (Oct. 28, 
1988) (on file with author). Prof. Williams' memo included several other criticisms concerning the 
ways the substance and presentation of these materials could serve to legitimate racist points of view 
and disempower minority students. She notes that the presentational format of the materials privi-
leges the viewpoint of this "informed" technical elite, that students will most likely not be conver-
sant with the basic research and data and hence will not be prepared to counter the pseudoscience 
contained in the articles, and that the Gould dissent is bracketed by materials that serve contextuaUy 
to undervalue its viewpoint. 
59. Of course, in addition to offering her perspective, the author has also made an objective 
normative claim that the materials are offensive. For an insightful discussion of how recognizing the 
subjectivity of one's perspective does not preclude making objective normative claims, see Veronica 
Gentilli, A Double Challenge/or Critical Race Scholars: The Moral Context, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 
2361 (1992). 
60. Selwyn R. Cudjoe, Maya Angelou and the "Autobigraphical Statement," in BLACK WOMEN 
WRITERS (1950-1980): A CRITICAL EVALUATION (Mari Evans ed., 1984) [hereinafter BLACK 
WOMEN WRITERS]. Cudjoe calls the autobiographical statement "the most Afro-American of aU 
Afro-American literary pursuits. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, thousands of 
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street philosopher Hanna Nelson on the capacity of blacks' speech to 
transmit experience. 
Our speech is most directly personal, and every black person assumes 
that every other black person has a right to a personal opinion. In 
speaking of great matters, your personal experience is considered evi-
dence. With us, distant statistics are certainly not as important as the 
actual experience of a sober person.61 
Paradoxically, the special authority given to personal expression of 
intensely lived experience in the black community results in an Afro-
American autobiograpical form that is free of excessive sUbjectivism or 
mindless egotism. In speaking of Afro-American autobiography, Cudjoe 
says, 
[I]t presents the Afro-American as reflecting a much more impersonal 
condition, the autobiographical subject emerging as an almost random 
member of the group, selected to tell hislher tale. As a consequence, 
the Afro-American autobiographical statement emerges as a public 
gesture, me-ism gives way to our-ism and superficial concerns about 
individual subject usually give way to the collective subjection of the 
groUp.62 
Matsuda's observation that the jurisprudence of color is "con-
sciously historical and revisionist,,63 identifies a particularly important 
function of positioned perspective. Adopting a positioned perspective is 
to write our histories: to tell the silenced stories, the unrecorded perspec-
tives, of our foremothers and forefathers. Historical revisionism is criti-
cal because full personhood is itself defined in part by one's authority to 
tell one's own story.64 Historians make history even as they record it.6s 
autobiographies of Afro-American slaves appeared. . •. The practice .•• remains the quintessential 
literary genre for capturing the cadences of the Afro-American being." ld. at 6. 
61. JOHN L. GWALTNEY, DRYLONGSO: A SELF PORTRAIT OF BLACK AMEltiCA 8 (1980) 
(quoting from a conversation with Hanna Nelson, a 61-year-old black woman from Harlem). Prof. 
Gwaltney reports that Mrs. Nelson's neighbors call her "Professor" and notes that she has "read and 
listened avidly and systematically •.. and has taught herself1anguages, cuisines and art forms." ld. 
She has supported herself for most of her life through the drudgery of domestic service. ld. 
that 
62. Cudjoe, supra note 60, at 4-5. 
63. Matsuda, supra note 10, at 7. 
64. See discussion infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
65. Joan Scott, describing the role of history in the construction of gender differences, argues 
[blistory figures ... not exclusively as the record of changes in the social organization of 
the sexes but also crucially as a participant in the production of knowledge about sexual 
difference. I assume that history's representations of the past help construct gender for the 
present. Analyzing how that happens requires attention to the assumptions, practices, and 
rhetoric of the discipline, to things either so taken for granted or so outside customary 
practice that they are not usually a focus for historians' attention. These include the 
notions that history can faithfully document lived reality, that archives are respositories of 
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Discovering and rewriting the record reshapes history itself and our con-
temporary social context is in turn changed.66 This becomes important 
to the liberating task of embracing a positioned perspective. What we see 
and feel today, our own perspectives and perceptions, appear distorted 
and unreal when they appear against the background of a history that 
has excluded the voices of those who have seen the world from positions 
most like our own. When we hear their stories our own stories take on a 
contextual frame that gives them meaning. They become more compre-
hensible. They are easier to trust. 
In Saving the Life that Is Your Own 67 Alice Walker tells the story of 
her discovery of the monumenta1life work of Zora Neal Hurston during 
her search for historical material on the craft of voodoo as practiced by 
blacks in the nineteenth century-material that would help her write a 
short story about a black woman who was such a craftsperson.68 Walker 
read all she could find on the subject; all of the authors were white, most 
of them were racist. "How was I to believe anything they wrote," she 
asks, "since at least one of them . . . was capable of wondering, in his 
book, if 'the Negro' had a large enough brain?,,69 When all seemed lost 
she saw in a footnote to the white voices of authority the name Zora Neal 
Hurston-novelist, essayist, anthropologist, autobiographer, and serious 
student of voodoo. Walker tells the story of this search and discovery to 
relate how she found the model that she feels every artist must have. 
Hurston was her model. Without a history of our own we have no mod-
els. It is these historical role models that give us a sense of the possibili-
ties for our own work. It is the historical underpinning of the work of 
those who have shared our perspective that prepares the ground for us 
and gives our work context. Speaking of this story that occasioned the 
discovery of her most important role model, Walker says, 
facts, and that categories like man and woman are transparent. They extend as well to 
examinations of the rhetorical practices of historians, the construction of historical texts, 
and the politics-that is, the power relationships-constituted by the discipline. In these 
essays history is as much the object of analytic attention as it is a method of analysis. 
Taken in both ways together, it provides a means for understanding and contributing to the 
process by which gender knowledge is produced. 
JOAN SCO'IT, GENDER AND THE POLmcs OF HISTORY 2-3 (1988). See generally R!COEUR, supra 
note 51. 
66. SCO'IT, supra note 65, at 2-3. 
67. ALICE WALKER, Saving the Life that Is Your Own: The Importance of Models in the Artist's 
Life. in IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS 3 (1983). 
68. Alice Walker, The Revenge of Hannah Kemhuff, in THE BEST AMERICAN SHORT STORIES 
(Martha Foley ed., 1974). 
69. WALKER, supra note 67, at 11. 
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In that story I gathered up the historical and psychological 
threads of the life my ancestors lived, and in the writing of it I felt joy 
and strength and my own continuity. I had that wonderful feeling that 
writers get sometimes, not very often, of being with a great many peo-
ple, ancient spirits, all very happy to see me consulting and acknowl-
edging them, and eager to let me know, through the joy of their 
presence, that, indeed I am not alone.70 
Finally, engaging in revisionist history is healing. In her work with 
black children and their families at Harlem Hospital and in Mississippi 
and Georgia, black child psychiatrist Margaret Lawrence has used both 
catharsis and the exploration of family ego strength to help children and 
their families cope with severe trauma and stress. Where too many of 
her colleagues have recognized only pathology among the black poor, 
Dr. Lawrence espouses and employs a "humanizing approach which rec-
ognizes a shared developmental dynamics common to all socio-economic 
classes.'m She says that it is the "identification and utilization of 
existing ego strengths among these families that makes therapeutic inter-
vention possible."72 For Lawrence, ego strengths are representative not 
only of individual development but of cultural and historical evolution. 
In Young Inner City Families 73 she uses a series of case studies to demon-
strate the evidence of persistent ego strengths in these families and to 
show how engaging in revisionist developmental history with these fami-
lies can help them combat the effects of societal trauma. 
In a paper describing a similar study of Georgia preschool children 
whose families had recently been active in the civil rights struggle of the 
'60s, Lawrence reports the same success in achieving therapeutic results 
by bringing to light and identifying vital family ego strengths, many of 
which were discovered through the exploration of the historical, social, 
and cultural backgrounds of those families.74 She writes, 
70. Id. at 13. 
71. Margaret Morgan Lawrence, Family Trauma and Preventive Interaction, in THE CHILD IN 
HIS FAMILY: PREVENTIVE CHILD PSYCHIATRY IN AN AGE OF TRANsmoN 473 (E. James 
Anthony & Colette Chiland eds., 1980). 
72. Id. 
73. MARGARET MORGAN LAWRENCE, YOUNG INNER CITY FAMILIES: DEVELOPMENT OF 
EGo STRENGTH UNDER STRESS (1975). 
74. Lawrence, supra note 71, at 480. See also ROBERT COLES, CHILDREN OF CRISIS (1967) 
(making similar observations of children and their families involved in school desegregation in the 
South). Derrick Bell also considers the healing power of revisionist history in DERRICK BELL, The 
Right to Decolonize Black Minds: The Chronicle of the Slave Scrolls, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, 
supra note 41, at 215-35 [hereinafter BELL, The Right to Decolonize Black Minds]; see also Derrick 
Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) (an earlier version of BELL, 
The Right to Decolonize Black Minds, supra.) 
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A study of the strengths of pre-school children must be done in 
the context of family, even extended family and community. Ego ide-
als over many generations, coping patterns, patterns of conflict resolu-
tion, and sources of support are to be recognized. The young 
children's family plays, comparable dreams, their families' stories, 
myths, and dreams [must be] searched for evidence of assertiveness, 
good self-images, expressiveness, conflict resolution and self-control, 
creativity, and use of body in graceful pursuits and manipulative 
skills.7s 
Searching history to retrieve collective strengths is part of the work 
that must be done by law teachers engaged in liberating pedagogy. 
2. Subjectivity as Taking Sides: Embracing Nonneutrality 
If anything I do, in the way of writing novels or whatever I write, isn't 
about the village or the community or about you, then it isn't about 
anything. I am not interested in indulging myself in some private exer-
cise of my imagination . . . which is to say yes, the work must be 
political. 76 
The Word is also SUbjective in the sense that it makes no claim to 
value neutrality. Matsuda describes the jurisprudence of people of color 
as "pragmatist" and "bottom-line instrumentalist."" Freeman contrasts 
the result-oriented "victim perspective"78 with a "perpetrator perspec-
tive" that claims to seek neutral principles based on shared values but is 
"ultimately indifferent to the condition of the victim."79 This is another 
way of saying that practitioners of the Word evaluate work product 
(judicial opinions, legislation, organizing tactics, ideas, theory, poetry) 
according to the degree to which the effort serves the cause of liberation. 
Embracing instrumentalism, like owning one's perspective, serves a 
dual liberatory purpose. By keeping our politics at the forefront and 
measuring our work and that of others by the bottom line of results, we 
75. Lawrence, supra note 71, at 9-10. See also BELL, . The Right to Decolonize Black Minds. 
supra note 74, at 215-35. In this allegory Bell's protagonist describes the healing power of the 
message of the slave scrolls, a revisionist account of the seldom-read history of slavery in America. 
These scrolls, if studied as prescribed in "healing groups," produced a changed self-image in their 
readers that had a profound rehabilitative effect, eliminating the myriad marks of racial oppression, 
criminality, and self-hate. ld. at 215-21. 
76. Toni Morrison, Rootedness: The Ancestor as Foundation. in BLACK WOMEN WRITERS, 
supra note 60, at 339, 339-45. 
77. Matsuda, supra note 10, at 4. 
78. This perspective judges the efficacy of theories and remedies by whether using them elimi-
nates objective conditions associated with discrimination. See Freeman, supra note 23, at 1052-53. 
79. ld. at 1054. 
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can be certain that theory is disciplined by purpose and guided by the 
needs and resulting insight of those for whom change is most urgent. 80 
An avowedly political posture also serves as an antidote to the mystifying 
and oppressive properties of the dominant ideology of shared values and 
neutral principles. This is particularly important to the scholar con-
cerned with racial equality under circumstances in which the dominant 
legal ideology of equal opportunity employs the rhetoric of antidis-
crimination and equal treatment to disguise the clash in values between 
those who are burdened by and committed to ending discriminatory con-
ditions and those who are responsible for and benefit from those 
conditions.81 
The contrast between the Word's nonneutral commitment to results 
and dominant scholarship's professed quest for value neutrality and the 
identification of shared values, a quest that may well be indifferent to 
results, is striking in the context of faculty debates over the appropriate-
ness of quotas and set-asides to achieve race and gender diversity on law 
school faculties. A student paper submitted for my race discrimination 
class recounts the history of students' efforts to encourage the Stanford 
faculty to increase the numbers of minorities and women teaching at the 
law school. These efforts had included several informational.forums fea-
turing the dean and members of the appointment committee, informal 
conversations with individual faculty members, letters to the student 
paper, a student-sponsored affirmative action proposal (at times referred 
to as student demands), and student demonstrations in the dean's office 
and the faculty club. The paper also reports faculty responses to the 
student hiring proposal, a proposal that was submitted to the faculty by a 
coalition of student organizations representing minorities, women, and 
progressive white male students.82 
80. Pragmatism helps the scholar avoid elitism by forcing her always to judge the efficacy of 
theory by its usefulness in righting the everyday wrongs committed against those who are most 
oppressed. See Matsuda, supra note 16, at 344-45. 
81. Alan Freeman has described.the approach that seeks to find neutral constitutional princi-
ples in shared values as a "new formalism" that disguises the fact that legal doctrine arises from "a 
continuing dialectic of struggle, characterized by value clashes that •.. share no agreed upon refer-
ence point." Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradictio1l, Rationalizatio1l, in 
SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 71, 72 (Derrick Bell ed., 
1980). See also Freeman, supra note 23, at 1065-67. 
82. With respect to immediate hiring goals, the student demands included the following: 
1. Hire sufficient women and minority faculty to ensure that all students entering in fall, 
1988, are taught during their first year by at least one woman and one minority professor. 
This goal is not meant to create pressure on present or future women and minority faculty 
to teach first year classes, but to require sufficient appointments so that any normal rota-
tion of assignments will result in instruction by women and minority faculty for all first 
years. 
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The quota demand proved a useful point of separation among faculty 
members. People of color on the faculty supported the proposal. The 
white women on the faculty supported the "spirit" of the proposal, 
including most of the "process" changes, but would not publicly 
endorse the call for numerical quotas. The white men all actively 
opposed the quotas, while supporting some, but not all, of the process 
changes. It is undoubtedly exaggerated to say that people of color 
know we need quotas to make progress, white men won't accept quotas 
which require them to change, and white women are ambivalent, sym-
pathizing with the pro-affirmative action portion because of their own 
experience with sexism, but unwilling to support quotas because of an 
unwillingness to break with white skin privilege. Nevertheless, this 
generalization would accurately predict the positions of Stanford law 
faculty: "No 'whites' acting 'black' here!,,83 
The paper's author, himself a member of the student coalition that 
had presented the "quota demand:' begins his analysis with a clear artic-
ulation of the goal he would have affirmative action serve. This goal is 
the transformation of a "community dominated by eurocentric, patriar-
cal, hierarchical values" into a "genuinely multicultural community." 
He explains, 
Affirmative action means bringing sufficient numbers of women, peo-
ple of color, lesbians, gays, working class people, into communities 
dominated by upper-class, heterosexual white men to transform the 
communities into genuinely multicultural communities: to eradicate 
the domination of these men. Although any individual is capable of 
supporting or opposing eurocentrism or patriarchy or hierarchy, we 
recognize that the social experiences of race, class, gender and sexual 
orientation are so profound that no one from one group can act as 
proxy for another; that there cannot be feminism without a community 
of women; a non-racist community without a community of black peo-
ple; a sexually liberated community without a community of lesbians 
and a community of gays; a non-hierarchical community absent the 
presence, as equals, of people from the working class. Our voices can-
not be heard while it is still white men who dominate the hearing, nor 
while we internalize a manner that is not our own.84 
2. Of the six current open and funded faculty positions, fill at least four of the six with 
women and minorities; at least two women, at least two minorities, at least one woman of 
color. Also seek to hire lesbian and gay candidates and those sensitive to lesbian and gay 
issues. 
3. After the current six positions are filled, for every subsequent six openings, two women 
professors should be appointed and two minority professors should be appointed. 
83. Peter Haviland, Drawing Lines 17 (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
84. ld. 
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Once this result is articulated and embraced as essential to the liber-
atory struggle, a critical analysis of theories, policies, and practices that 
claim to support our cause is simplified. Such critical analysis begins by 
asking whether the policy or practice has or will produce results. One 
can then ask why the theory, practice, or policy under study falls short 
and, by employing this methodology, discover the mechanism whereby 
"neutral" principles disguise conflicting value-based choices. 
The student's paper effectively employs this mode of analysis to 
assess the statements of two faculty members in response to the student 
proposal. The first faculty statement reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
While individuals may differ about particular cases, the Law School 
clearly is committed to affinnative action. To the extent that numbers 
matter-and although they're only a part of the picture, they do mat-
ter-we have reason neither for great shame nor for great pride. Our 
regular faculty has five women, two Blacks, two Latinos, and we have 
an Asian-American visiting professor-a higher proportion than most 
law schools comparable to Stanford. Although I do not believe in quo-
tas, I agree that we have farther to go. The Law School is unequivo-
cally committed to the affinnative action search. This has been central 
to the Appointments Committee's agenda for many years, and is some-
thing that the Committee-which itself is a broadly representative 
group-is pursuing with extraordinary vigor this year. Because of our 
society'S long histories of discrimination, the numbers of women, and 
especially of minority, law teachers are not large-though fortunately 
they are growing. In looking for visitors as well as new permanent 
faculty, the Committee is searching widely for qualified minority and 
women candidates. Faculty members do differ in their views of what 
counts as "qualified" and how much risk the School should take in 
hiring individuals who do not meet the "standard" qualifications (for 
example, who have not graduated high in their classes at a major law 
school or published significant works of scholarship). These differ-
ences within a diverse faculty should not be surprising when there is 
lack of consensus throughout American society and when the Supreme 
Court itself has not been able to agree on the legality of certain forms 
of affirmative action. My own view, expressed in the forum on hiring 
last year, is that we should be open to examining our assumptions 
about what count as "qualifications," and in particular to understand-
ing the qualities that members of underrepresented groups may con-
tribute to the institution. But I should say that I would be cautious in 
departing very far from conventional standards of excellence.8s 
85. Id. 
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The position taken in this statement is twofold: (1) commitment to 
affirmative action means, most importantly, a commitment to a process of 
searching for candidates; (2) this commitment, while important, must be 
balanced against other priorities. Affirmative action is a discrete com-
mitment competing with others that may outweigh, or trump, affirmative 
action. 
Process is the key here because the purpose of affirmative action, 
presumed by the first statement, is merely to act as a counterbalance to 
particular discriminatory decisions in the hiring process. If "excellent" 
women and minority candidates are overlooked on the basis of their gen-
der or race, the active search for qualified women and minorities, taking 
race into account, is justified as a narrow corrective step designed to 
guard against discriminatory exclusion. 
The problem with this formulation of the situation is that "old-fash-
ioned" discrimination-any overt statement indicating that the candidate 
has been opposed because of race or gender-does not comport with the 
liberal ideology of an institution like the Stanford Law School. If there 
are those on the faculty harboring consciously racist or sexist attitudes, 
they will not admit them. A far greater number of us are likely to have 
repressed discriminatory motives.86 Thus, no candidates are excluded 
because of identifiable conscious discrimination, and an affirmative action 
process designed to correct such discrimination will not yield any new 
candidates because none have been discriminated against. The pool of 
injured parties is zero. 
The process of searching for candidates might also serve the purpose 
of discovering "overlooked" candidates who would not come to the 
attention of the faculty through the regular appointments process. But 
the concept of overlooked candidates, when examined closely, eventually 
leads to the more fundamental question of qualifications and standards. 
Minority candidates who have met the traditional standards-excep-
tional achievement at a prestigious law school and "outstanding" schol-
arship published in a leading professional journal-would and do come 
to the attention of the academic network. Individuals who are not given 
attention are overlooked because the faculty does not think their creden-
tials or work are of sufficient merit. 87 
86. See generally Lawrence, supra note 51 (arguing that equal protection doctrine fails to rem-
edy or recognize unconscious racism). 
87. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for Volun-
tary Quotas. 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 429 (1986). 
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Thus, a focus on process will yield few, if any, appointments because 
in the end the process continues to rely upon the validity of "standards," 
and the primary content of these standards is the subjective judgment of 
the faculty. Moreover, these standards do not place much value on 
achieving the students' primary goal: "the transformation of the law 
school community." On the contrary, faculty invocation of "standards" 
fatally undermines this goal by allowing it to be preempted, or trumped, 
by the conflicting goal of maintenance of "standards," in which those 
standards are defined in large part according to the subjective judgment 
of faculty members who are committed to maintaining the status quo 
within the law school community.88 
The positions of minority and progressive students and faculty in 
this debate fall squarely within Alan Freeman's categories of victim per-
spective and perpetrator perspective.89 The students' goal of "transfor-
mation of the community" is an articulation of their understanding that 
until the conditions of discrimination are eliminated there can be no 
equality of opportunity. The faculty response views the task as the elimi-
nation of discriminatory conduct by identifiable perpetrators. If they are 
convinced that this has been done, they are not troubled by unchanged 
conditions. 
By embracing the "victim perspective," practitioners of the Word 
will know that until there are results the fight must continue. We will 
also more easily deconstruct perpetrator theory by beginning our analysis 
with the understanding that failed results are symptomatic of an enter-
prise that has not given the goal of our liberation top priority. With this 
in mind, we must locate the point where our values (those things we put 
first among our priorities) diverge from the values of the perpetrators and 
work from there. 
3. Subjectivity as Standing in the Position of the Subject 
Stories are important. They keep us alive. In the ships, in the camps, 
in the quarters, fields, prisons, on th~ road, on the run, underground, 
under siege, in the throes, on the verge-the storyteller snatches us 
back from the edge to hear the next chapter. In which we are the sub-
jects. We, the hero. of the tales. Our lives preserved. ;How it was; how 
88. The student paper notes that the faculty member's statement claims an openness to criticiz-
ing standards. "We should be open to examining our assumptions about what count as 'qualifica-
tions,' and in particular to understanding the qualities that the members of underrepresented groups 
may contribute to the institution. But I should say that I would be cautious in departing very far 
from conventional standards of excellence." Haviland, supra note 83, at 30-31. 
89. Freeman. supra note 23, at 1053. 
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it be. Passing it along in the relay. That is what I work to do: to 
produce stories that save our lives.90 
I AM SOMEBODY! 
-Jesse Jackson 
2265 
In this section I use the word "subjectivity" to indicate that as prac-
titioners of the Word we must endeavor to place ourselves in the linguis-
tic position of "subject" rather than "object." That is, we must be actors 
rather than those upon whom others act. This is, for us, an especially 
important understanding of subjectivity, for the language we use to 
describe ourselves is both evidence of how we see ourselves and part of 
the means whereby our self-image is shaped. Language shapes our real-
ity even as it describes it. This, in part, was the lesson of my discussion 
of positioned perspective. But I want to suggest something more than 
what is learned from the observation that our perceptions of the world 
are valid and that the articulation of those perceptions must be privileged 
in the context of a discourse that objectifies and universalizes the percep-
tions of those who dominate that discourse. When we use language to 
refer to ourselves, we do more than offer another possible description of 
the world around us. We define ourselves and our relationship to that 
world. 
The language of self-description has been a particularly powerful 
and important weapon in the liberationist struggle by African Ameri-
cans. The absence of a collective black voice was central to the ethnocen-
tric ideology of the European Renaissance and the Enlightenment-an 
ideology that denied Africans their humanity and thereby justified their 
enslavement. Henry Louis Gates notes that for the Enlightenment phi-
losophers the absence of a self-portrayal, of a written history, meant that 
Africans had "no true self consciousness, no power to present or repre-
sent the black and terrible self":91 
[B]lacks lay veiled in a shroud of silence, invisible not because they had 
no face, but rather because they had no voice. Voice, after all, presup-
poses a face. That alone which separates the subject from the object is, 
for Hegel, the absence or presence of the voice, the phenomenological 
voice; the blackness of invisibility is the blackness of this silence. 
Without a voice, the African is absent, or defaced, from history.92 
90. Toni Cade Bambara, Salvation Is the Issue. in BLACK WOMEN WRITERS. supra note 60, at 
41,41-47. 
91. HENRY loUIS GATES, JR., Frederick Douglass and the Language of Self, in FIGURES IN 
BLACK: WORDS, SIGNS, AND THE "RACIAL" SELF 98, 104 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed., 1987). 
92. Id. 
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Early practitioners of the Word recognized the necessity of self-rep-
resentation to combat this dehumanizing ideology that determined one's 
very being by presence, or lack thereof, in history and in turn viewed 
one's absence from history as proof of one's lack of consciousness. Fred-
erick Douglass and others created the genre of slave narratives to render 
in horrific detail the inhumanity of the slave system, but their purpose 
was also to break the silence that made them objects. Gates says of the 
slave narratives, "[T]his written language of the ex-slave signified for 
someone even before it signified something."93 
By speaking, by writing, African Americans placed themselves in 
the active position of the "I," or "eye." They became the writer/pro-
ducer/directors and the audience of the play. In so doing they subverted 
the ideology that claimed them incapable of consciousness. It is the act 
of telling one's own story, of creating the characters and writing the 
script, that transforms the teller from object to subject. Thus, Gates 
speaks of the "fictive selves" that Douglass created in his three autobiog-
raphies.94 Gates does not use the word "fictive" to suggest falsity or 
intent to deceive; rather, he refers to "the act of crafting or making by 
design.,,95 . 
There is another important element in the work of Douglass that is 
paradigmatic in its use of SUbjectivity. His autobiographies are represen-
tations of public selves. He is concerned with making individual experi-
ence the source of public history. In this way he breaks the silence for all 
blacks and, by becoming the representative for his brothers and sisters, 
makes them all subjects. I have spoken earlier of how this public, repre-
sentational stance is of central importance to Afro-American autobio-
graphical statement.96 
Postmodern literary theorists have articulated the occurrence of this 
act of self-identification through language by defining SUbjectivity as the 
"'capacity of the speaker to posit himself as subject.' Subjectivity is 
viewed as a fundamental property of language. 'It is in and through lan-
guage that man constitutes himself as subject, because language alone 
93. Id. at 105. 
94. Id. at 103. Douglass' three autobiographies are THE NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FRED-
ERICK DOUGLASS: AN AMERICAN SLAVE, WRITTEN By HIMSELF (Dublin, Webb and Chapman 
1845) (note Douglass' reference in the title to his authorship); My BONDAGE My FREEDOM (New 
York, Miller, Orten and Mulligan 1855); and THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 
(Citadell Press 1984) (1881). 
95. GATES, supra note 91, at 103. 
96. Cudjoe, supra note 60, at 10. 
1992] THE WORD AND THE RIVER 2267 
establishes the concept of ego in reality, in its reality.' ,,97 Thus, language 
is important because its use signifies, is symbolic of, the speaker's capac-
ity for creativity; and it is the capacity for creativity that makes us 
human. 
The history of Mrican-American efforts to name ourselves, as the 
first enunciating act of self-definition, and of the resistance to that effort, 
is testimony to the importance of the symbolism of language in the polit-
ical/cultural hegemony of American racism. Mrican slaves were prohib-
ited from using their family, ancestral, and tribal names. Instead they 
were required to use the "Christian" names by which their masters chose 
to identify them. After emancipation, the practice of whites naming 
blacks and denying blacks the power to name themselves remained cen-
tral to the system of symbols that objectified Mrican Americans and 
denied their humanity.98 
In the 1920s the NAACP launched a hard-fought campaign for the 
use of the word "Negro" (with a capital "N"). For too long Mrican 
Americans had heard themselves called "niggers," "jigs," "dinges," 
"blackbirds," "crows," and "spooks." "Colored," the word then used by 
respectable whites and many Negroes, was offensive in the main because 
whites insisted on using it. Whatever its origin, the name was now the 
white man's property, a word he used to name those who could not name 
themselves. Our insistence, in the 1960s, on being called "Black" rather 
than "Negro" was likewise an effort to assume the position of subject.99 
97. HUTCHEON, supra note 51, at 1611 (quoting EMILE BENVENISTE, SUBJECTIVITY IN LAN-
GUAGE (1971». 
98. Perhaps the most striking example of the objectification of blacks is the black minstrel 
show. White men in blackface litera11y created blacks in their own image (imaginings). This white 
imaging of blacks as "natural slaves," as "Sambo," lived on in the radio voices of Amos 'n Andy, in 
screen characters like Step 'n Fetchit, and in American cultural artifacts like Aunt Jemima. See 
JOSEPH BOSKIN, SAMBO: THE RISE & DEMISE OF THE AMERICAN JESTER (1987). See also DON-
ALD BOYLE, TOMS, COONS, MULATTOES, MAMMIES AND BUCKS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY 
OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN FILMS (1973) (historical treatment of the portrayal of African Americans 
in the mass media). 
99. In 1964, when Cassius Clay won the heavyweight crown from Sonny Liston, he announced 
that he had become a Black Muslim and that the Hon. Elijah Muhammed had given him the name 
Muhammed Ali. Initially most reporters refused his request that he be referred to by his new name. 
Ali responded by saying, "I know where I'm going •.. and I don't have to be what you want me to 
be." Bayard Rustin, Blacks? African Americans?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1989, at A25). 
The contemporary version of resistance to our subjective naming of self is more subtle and 
ingenious. Recently, when Jesse Jackson suggested that black Americans should call themselves 
African Americans there ensued a vigorous debate in the white press. Some, including the New York 
Times, supported the Rev. Jackson's suggestion. Others argued against the proposal. What I found 
interesting and instructive was that the tone of all of these commentators was proprietary. White 
folks assumed that they would be the final judge of whether this new name was appropriate. See also 
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When I was an undergraduate at Haverford College, the white girls 
at Bryn Mawr, our sister college, still followed the tradition of calling the 
black women who worked as maids and cooks in the dorms "Mary" or 
"Sarah," while the black women, many of whom were old enough to be 
their grandmothers, called them "Miss Williston" or "Miss Jones." I 
had been taught by my parents to take special care to address black 
adults by their appropriate title and surname. They wanted me to know 
that one should show respect for one's elders, but this was also a lesson in 
subjectivity; we must not allow white folks to define us as children. By 
addressing these women as "Miss" and "Mrs." I named myself. 
Ralph Ellison's powerful prologue to his classic Invisible Man exem-
plifies the empowering use of subjectivity. Ellison not only places his 
narrator in the position of a viewing, interpreting, and creating subject, 
but also has the narrator describe his complete and utter objectification 
by whites. 100 
I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who 
haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor am lone of your Hollywood-movie 
ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and 
liquids-and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, 
understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless 
heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have 
been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they 
approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments 
of their imagination-indeed, everything and anything except me. lol 
Ellison's narrator goes on to describe a chance encounter with a tall 
blond man who bumps into him in the darkness and calls him an insult-
ing name. 
Alice Walker's discussion of reclaiming the word "Mammy," in ALICE WALKER, LIVING By THE 
WORD 58-63 (1981). 
100. By creating a speaking subject who describes himself as object Ellison employs the rhetori-
cal strategy of antithesis. Henry Gates discusses Frederick Douglass' use of this technique. In 
speaking of Douglass' use of binary opposition, Gates says, 
Douglass's narrative strategy seems to be this: He brings together two terms in special 
relationships suggested by some quality that they share; then, by opposing two seemingly 
unrelated elements, such as sheep, cattle, or horses on the plantation and the specimen of 
life known as slave, Douglass's language is made to signifY the presence and absence of 
some quality-in this case, humanity. Douglass uses this device to explicate the slave's 
understanding of himself and of his relation to the world through the system of perceptions 
that defined the world the planters made. 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Binary Oppositions in Chapter One of Narrative of the Life of Frederick 
Douglass an American Slave Written by Himself, in AFRo-AMERICAN LITERATURE: THE RECON-
SfRUCTION OF INSfRUCTlON 212, 222-23 (Dexter Fisher & Robert Stepto eds., 1979). 
101. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 3 (1952). 
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I sprang at him, seized his coat lapels and demanded that he apologize. 
He was a tall blond man, and as my face came close to his he looked 
insolently out of his blue eyes and cursed me, his breath hot in my face 
as he struggled. I pulled his chin down sharp upon the crown of my 
head, butting him as I had seen the West Indians do, and I felt his flesh 
tear and the blood gush out, and I yelled, "Apologize! Apologize!" 
But he continued to curse and struggle, and I butted him again and 
again until he went down heavily, on his knees, profusely bleeding. I 
kicked him repeatedly, in a frenzy because he still uttered insults 
though his lips were frothy with blood. Oh yes, I kicked him! And in 
my outrage I got out my knife and prepared to slit his throat, right 
there beneath the lamplight in the deserted street, holding him in the 
collar with one hand, and opening the knife with my teeth-when it 
occurred to me that the man had not seen me, actually; that he, as far 
as he knew, was in the midst of a walking nightmare! And I stopped 
the blade, slicing the air as I pushed him away, letting him fall back to 
the street. I stared at him hard as the lights of a car stabbed through 
the darkness. He lay there, moaning on the asphalt; a man almost 
killed by a phantom. It unnerved me. I was both disgusted and 
ashamed. I was like a drunken man myself, wavering about on weak-
ened legs. Then I was amused: Something in this man's thick head 
had sprung out and beaten him within an inch of his life. I began to 
laugh at this crazy discovery. Would he have awakened at the point of 
death? Would Death himself have freed him for wakeful living? But I 
didn't linger. I ran away into the dark, laughing so hard I feared I 
might rupture myself. The next day I saw his picture in the Daily 
News, beneath a caption stating that he had been "mugged." Poor 
fool, poor blind food, I thought with sincere compassion, mugged by 
an invisible man!102 
Ellison makes his black narrator an articulate subject who is capable 
of seeing and describing (of creating) a white male subject. This subject, 
the narrator's white victim, cannot see the narrator because for him the 
narrator is object. He can only be a nightmare, a figment of the white 
man's imagination. By juxtaposing the subject-narrator with the objecti-
fied invisible man created by the tall, blond mugging victim, Ellison sub-
verts the ideology of the unified white writing subject. When he places 
himself in the position of subject, Ellison, through his narrator, does not 
simply assume the white male role and make all others object. He creates 
another subject. This is apparent from the narrator's ability to see (or 
not see) himself through the eyes of his victim. "I got out my knife and 
prepared to slit his throat ... when it occurred to me that the man had 
102. [d. at 4. 
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not seen me, actually; that he, as far as he knew, was in the midst of a 
walking nightmare!" 103 
Linda Hutcheon has observed that this positing of multiple subjects 
constitutes a considerably more radical challenge to notions of "universal 
truths," or a "transcendental . . . subject that is outside of any social, 
political or sexual history,,,I04 than would a mere assumption of the 
traditional universal subject's role by those who have historically been 
objectified. In speaking of another novel, The White Hotel, and its use of 
a similar rhetorical technique in relation to gender subjectivity, she says, 
Both The White Hotel and much feminist theory today confront the 
relation of non-coincidence between the discursive construct of 
"woman" and the historical subjects called "women." Both expose 
this as a culturally determined relationship, intimately related to cul-
tural notions of femininity. And both suggest that the representation 
of woman must now be destabilized and altered. lOS 
Practitioners of the Word must assume the position of subject. We 
must assert our humanity by making ourselves the heroes and heroines of 
our tales and by unashamedly employing "I" and "We" in our language. 
We must describe other subjects in our stories and, by presenting multi-
ple points of view, subvert the closed, coherent, noncontradictory world 
that makes us objects. 106 
B. THE GIFT (AND BURDEN) OF SECOND SIGHT: 
EMBRACING DUALITY 
The Universe sends me fabulous dreams! Early this morning I 
dreamed of a two-headed woman. Literally. . . . Who was giving 
advice to people .... Her knowledge was for everyone and it was all 
striking. While one head talked the other seemed to doze. I was so 
astonished! For what I realized in the dream is that two-headed ness 
103. [d. 
104. See HUTCHEON, supra note 51, at 165. 
105. [d. at 166. 
106. The justice-engendering power of multiple subjectivity is central to much of Patricia Wil-
liams' jurisprudential work. "Rights contain images of power, and manipUlating those images, 
either visually or linguistically, is central to the making and maintenance of rights. In principle, 
therefore, the more dizzyingly diverse the images that are propagated, the more empowered we will 
be as a society." Patricia Williams, On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 5 (1988). This quote is 
followed by six paragraphs, each describing the same incident (a child killed by a polar bear at the 
Prospect Park Zoo) from six different subjective views: the polar bear, the newspapers, the public 
debate, the pluralist, the keynote speaker of the Law & Society Association (the author, Pat Wil-
liams), and the presiding priest at the child's funeral. [d. 
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was at one time an actual physical condition and that two-headed peo-
ple were considered wise. Perhaps this accounts for the adage "[t]wo 
heads are better than one ... ,,107 
In 1903 W.E.B. Du Bois, in his small and powerful work The Souls 
of Black Folk, described the gift and burden that are inherent in the dual 
and conflicting heritage of all Mrican Americans. 
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with 
second sight in this American world, a world that yields him no true 
self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation 
of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double conscious-
ness, this sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others, 
of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused 
contempt and pity. 
One ever feels this twoness in the American Negro. Two souls, 
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one 
dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being tom 
asunder. lOB 
Du Bois' consciousness and understanding of this duality within 
himself was critical to his work as one of the leading practitioners of the 
Word. He kept his twoness before him despite the pain and anxiety it 
caused him. He understood that the gift of second sight was contained 
within and was nurtured by the burden and the pain. Patricia Williams, 
echoing Du Bois' words eighty-five years later, demonstrates the contem-
porary validity of his insight. In On Being the Object of Property, 109 she 
recalls the origins of her discovery of her duality in a story about her 
mother's admonition, as she departed to begin her studies at Harvard 
Law School, that she remember that she had the law "in her blood."llo 
What I know of my mother's side of the family begins with my 
great-great-grandmother. Her name was Sophie and she lived in Ten-
nessee. In 1850, she was about twelve years old. I know that she was 
purchased when she was eleven by a white lawyer named Austin 
Miller and was immediately impregnated by him. She gave birth to 
my great-grandmother Mary, who was taken away from her to be 
raised as a house servant. I know nothing more of Sophie (she was, 
after all, a black single mother-in today's terms-suffering the ano-
nymity of yet another statistical teenage pregnancy). While I don't 
remember what I was told about Austin Miller before I decided to go 
107. WALKER, supra note 99, at 1. 
108. Du BOIS, supra note 13, at 16-17. 
109. Williams, supra note 106, at 5·6. 
110. [d. at 6. 
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to law school, I do remember that just before my first day of class, my 
mother said, in a voice full of secretive reassurance, "The Millers were 
lawyers, so you have it in your blood." 
When my mother told me that I had nothing to fear in law school, 
that law was "in my blood," she meant it in a very complex sense. 
First and foremost, she meant it defiantly; she meant that no one 
should make me feel inferior because someone else's father was a 
judge. She wanted me to reclaim that part of my heritage from which 
I had been disinherited, and she wanted me to use it as a source of 
strength and self-confidence. At the same time, she was asking me to 
claim a part of myself that was the dispossessor of another part of 
myself; she was asking me to deny that disenfranchised little black girl 
of myself that felt powerless, vulnerable and, moreover, rightly felt so. 
In somewhat the same vein, Mother was asking me not to look to 
her as a role model. She was devaluing that part of herself that was 
not Harvard and refocusing my vision to that part of herself that was 
hard-edged, proficient, and Western. She hid the lonely, black, 
defined-female part of herself and pushed me forward as the projection 
of a competent self, a cool rather than despairing self, a masculine 
rather than a feminine self. 111 
It is this exploration, understanding, and embracing of her duality 
that allows Williams to employ the gift by using what she refers to as "~m 
intentionally double-voiced and relational, rather than a traditionally 
legal black-letter, vocabulary.,,112 Her work moves back and forth across 
the boundaries of her experience-a professor of contracts and commer-
cial law who is knowledgeable of and facile with theories of promissory 
estoppel, unconscionability, and market norms, and her life as a black 
woman who is refused entry into exclusive New York boutiques l13 and 
feels a sense of powerlessness, despite her training and knowledge, as she 
prepares to negotiate her rental contract with a New York landlord. 114 
She does not compartmentalize these two parts of her life, teaching and 
111. Id. 
112. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 6. For further discussion of the intentional use of mUltiple 
consciousness, see Kendall Thomas, A House Divided Against Itself: A Comment on "Mastery, Slav-
ery, and Emancipation," 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1481, 1489-91 (1989) (discussing how slaves 
presented different sides of themselves when interacting with a white master and with other slaves); 
see also Marl J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: MUltiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential 
Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 7 (1989) (urging lawyers to see the world from the standpoint of 
the oppressed and to maintain multiple consciousness as a way of transferring the details of our own 
special knowledge to the standard jurisprudential discourse). 
113. Matsuda, supra note 112, at 44-51. 
114. Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987). 
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writing from her privileged and powerful professional perspective and 
living her experiences of subordination, anger, fear, shame, solidarity, 
and guerrilla warfare in a private, secret life. Instead, the law professor is 
informed and provoked by the black woman's personal knowledge of 
blacks as property and women as gender property. She uses that part of 
her which is her great-grandmother to illuminate the socially constructed 
foundations on which the law is built. Her purposeful attention to and 
nurturing of her duality allows her to build bridges between the real-
world experience of the dispossessed and elite legal discourse. 
In And We Are Not Saved,115 Professor Derrick Bell employs the 
literary device of conversations with a fictional colleague and friend to 
express his own duality and that of all African Americans. Geneva, a 
black woman, is a talented, committed, and highly skilled civil rights 
attorney. A valued colleague and trusted friend, she worked closely with 
her protagonist, Professor Bell, when they were both young lawyers 
doing civil rights work in the South. Geneva's brilliant career was cut 
short when she suffered a serious mental illness, the result of a racial 
attack, and was hospitalized. During a two-decade hospitalization she 
loses contact with her old friends and colleagues. She also experiences a 
series of visions. She has now returned, seeking her friend Professor 
Bell's assistance in interpreting her otherworldly experiences. 
Geneva is militant, mystical, poetic, uncompromising, impatient, 
and demanding. She does not suffer fools gladly, particularly the all-too-
often-evidenced foolishness of her friend and brother Professor Bell. Her 
analyses are quick and incisive. Her otherworldly experience has freed 
her from any of the ambivalence of belonging to the ranks of the 
oppressed and commitment to the status quo. She is not seduced by 
arguments and ideologies that promise freedom but do not deliver. 
Professor Bell shares her aspirations and her instinct but is impris-
oned by his faith in the law, by his hard-earned success and status in the 
legal academy, and by having experienced the last twenty years of slow 
but steady change in the legal and economic status of many blacks. His 
eyes are clouded and his perceptions are inhibited by his own investment 
of emotion and energy in the system that Geneva attacks so mercilessly 
and by the ways his work has been rewarded by that system. 
Bell's use of the fictional female character in this outsider role is not 
fortuitous. African Americans have traditionally used fiction to mask 
their most radical thoughts and aspirations. From the Negro spirituals 
115. BELL, supra note 41. 
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that disguised their own quest for freedom in the stories of Old Testa-
ment heroes to the Brother Rabbit stories to the contemporary work of 
Toni Morrison and Alice Walker, blacks have often told their most com-
pelling truths in fiction. That Geneva is a woman is in part a reflection of 
Bell's own personal experience with black women. 116 It is black women 
who have most consistently called us to account and required our alle-
giance to the outsider half of our duality. They are more completely 
outsiders in a world that is patriarchal as well as racist. 
Professor Bell plays the role of translator in this story. When 
Geneva tells a visionary chronicle it is Bell who provides us with the 
perspective that the dominant legal doctrine would bring to the story. 
He is ambivalent and sometimes embarrassed at having to be the spokes-
person for the legal establishment, but he cannot easily abandon this role. 
The part of our duality that wants to belong, that feels a part of the 
world that excludes us, wants that world to be an ally and not an enemy. 
This part of Bell is looking for ways the law will aid and abet out libera-
tion. He is looking for ways to show his white colleagues and friends 
how their work has failed us. He is looking for words that will help them 
understand Geneva's visions. This is Professor Bell's real-life role, and 
that of most of us who seek to do the work of the Word from within the 
white academy. By using himself to express this side of our duality Bell 
reveals that aspect of his twoness that makes him most vulnerable. He 
practices the Word by candidly sharing his own struggle against the 
internalization of dominant ideology. It is Geneva who chastises Bell, 
who is often more persuasive, who calls him and us back to our own 
experiential truths. But it is Bell's willingness to tell the story of his not 
always successful struggle to reconcile his desire to belong with his com-
mitment to struggle for his people's freedom that helps the rest of us 
continue that struggle. 
The first gift of our inherent duality is its revelation of the inevitabil-
ity and value of positional perspective. What Du Bois described as "this 
sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others" gives the 
outsider at least two pictures of the object that is himself. 
As nonwhites we are constantly bombarded with more or less severe 
caricatures of ourselves as we are seen by whites. We cannot help but 
contrast these views, these perspectives, of who and what we are with our 
own experience. Nor can we help but understand that our own view is 
116. Bell dedicates the book as follows: "To Ada Elisabeth Bell, my mother; to Jewel Hairston 
Bell, my wife; and to all our Genevas." 
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not universal. Those who stand wholly within the dominant culture sel-
dom if ever hear how others view them and often ignore or deny those 
descriptions on the rare occasions when they are confronted by them. 1 17 
Duality also engenders empathy. One can put oneself in the shoes 
of another and share another's experience and feeling only to the extent 
that one can imagine an experience other than one's own. We who expe-
rience the duality of belonging and not belonging know the possibility of 
different and even conflicting experience at the same moment in time and 
space and our ability to imagine experience other than our own is thus 
enhanced. This talent for empathy is particularly important for practi-
tioners of the Word whose ultimate task is to liberate. We must strive to 
understand experiences of oppression that are not our own, we must 
work in concert with those who experience other forms of oppression, 
because we cannot achieve freedom while others remain enslaved. 
Our duality also allows us to empathize with the oppressor. This is 
essential to the task of casting out that part of each of us that is a 
slavemaster.118 Our ability to recognize the oppressor's experience, to 
know it within ourselves, is also useful in our efforts to heal and reform 
others who participate in our oppression. When we have struggled with 
that part of our duality that identifies with the oppressor, we possess an 
empathy that helps us explain how our oppression is integrally linked to 
that of our oppressors. 119 
117. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. See also SHIRLEY ANNE WILLIAMS, DESSA 
ROSE (1986). Williams describes a white writer observing a slave woman. We learn that the slave 
woman is acutely aware of how the white writer/researcher perceives her and that he is quite una-
ware of how she is seeing him. ld. See also Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: 
Legal Theory out o/Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1201 (1991) (discussing the importance of building 
coalitions in the struggle against subordination and arguing that coalition building requires an 
understanding of the intersectionality of various forms of oppression). Prof. Matsuda says, 
The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is through a 
method I call 'ask the other question.' When I see something that looks racist, I ask, 
"Where is the patriarchy in this?" When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, "Where 
is the heterosexism in this?" When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, "Where 
are the class interests in this?" Working in coalition forces us to look for both the obvious 
and non-obvious relationships of domination, helping us to realize that no form of subordi-
nation ever stands alone. 
ld. at 1207. 
118. FREIRE, supra note 44, at 32-34. 
119. In speaking of how the oppressed must participate in developing the pedagogy of their own 
liberation, Paolo Freire says, "Only as they discover themselves to be 'hosts' of the oppressor can 
they contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy. . .• The pedagogy of the oppressed is 
an instrument for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations of 
dehumanization." ld. at 33. 
Freire on objectivity: 
The investigator who, in the name of scientific objectivity, transforms the organic into 
something inorganic, what is becoming into what is, life into death, is a man who fears 
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There are heavy burdens that accompany the gift of second sight, 
the talent for bridge building and the skill of bilingualism. Bearing these 
burdens is especially stressful for people of color who work in the relative 
isolation of the white academy, and these burdens can become disabling 
if they go unrecognized or ignored. Practitioners of the Word must learn 
to support one another in bearing these burdens and they must learn how 
and when to refuse to carry the load.120 There is a saying among Irish 
poets that the translator is a traitor. Black scholars work within a tradi-
tion and discourse in which the white male voice is dominant. Much of 
our work is necessarily translation. We are either translating the work of 
our colleagues in the legal establishment for use by our brothers and sis-
ters who seek needed, if temporary, remedies in that establishment's legal 
institutions, or we are translating the life experience of our brothers and 
sisters in the hope that broader awareness of that experience will produce 
new converts to the cause of liberation. But translation is a treacherous 
business. Translation of the colonizer's canon spreads its hegemonic 
message to ears and minds that it might not otherwise have reached. I 
experience a strong sense of ambivalence as I help black law students 
understand and work with legal doctrine. As they become fluent in this 
new language I watch them internalize its assumptions and accept its 
descriptions and meanings. I see them lose fluency in first and second 
languages of understanding that they brought with them to law 
school. 121 
I also watch myself struggle to maintain some fluency in languages 
that are expressive of liberating themes. This is particularly difficult 
when one is submerged in an institutional and professional culture where 
neither these languages nor the themes they express are valued or 
rewarded. 122 When, for example, I was writing my article on the intent 
change. He sees in change not a sign of life, but a sign of death and decay. • •. However, 
in seeing change as a sign of death and in making people the passive objects of investigation 
in order to arrive at rigid models, he betrays his own character as a killer of life. 
ld. at 99-}oo. 
120. Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in THIS 
BRIDGE CALLED My BACK 98, 100 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua cds., 1983). See also 
Rennard Strickland, Scholarship in the Academic Circus or the Balancing Act at the Minority Side 
Show, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 491, 497-98 (1986). ' 
121. Cf Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. 
L. REv. 1299, 1313-21 (1988). 
122. See generally Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in Still 
White Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 385 (1986); Richard Delgado, Minority Projessors' Lives: The 
Bell-Delgado Survey, 3 INST. FOR LEGAL STUD. (1988); Andrew Haines, Minority Law Professors 
and the Myth of Sisyphus: Consciousness and Praxis Within the Special Teaching Challenge in Amer-
ican Law Schools, 10 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 247 (1988); Strickland, supra note 120. 
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requirement and unconscious racism,123 I found myself constantly strug-
gling to maintain an integrity of both voice and substantive position. I 
recognized quite early on that it was my effort to speak to two audi-
ences-the ambivalent, and potentially treacherous, role of translator-
that was causing me such anxiety and fueling an always lurking writer's 
block. In order to integrate new insights into existing theory and case 
law I was forced to speak in terms that accepted by implication certain 
assumptions I did not share.124 Even when I managed to remain true to 
my convictions, professional pressures required that I employ language 
and references that threatened to make my work inaccessible to a large 
part of the audience I most hoped to reach. 125 
We must always keep in mind Du Bois' insight that it is precisely 
these burdens that bear the gift of second sight. We must learn not to 
fiee to the safety of assimilation or isolationism, but to learn from the war 
within us and use the pluralist integration of our two selves as a guiding 
star in our pursuit of liberation. We must strive for a single voice that 
does not subvert or subordinate either of our selves, that instead demands 
that others recognize in our contradictory persona a paradigm for mu1-
tidimensionality, for connecting understandings of our reality, under-
standings that reveal the complexity of social meaning and foster the 
fight for freedom. 126 
123. Lawrence, supra note 51. 
124. Perhaps the best example of this was my effort to demonstrate that by use of a cultural 
meaning test the Court could avoid the slippery slope of applying heightened scrutiny to all classifi-
cations that disadvantage the poor. Despite my disclaimers the impact of this argument was to 
accept and support the Court's position that wealth classifications are not suspect. I am contemplat-
ing writing an article arguing that poverty has taken on a cultural meaning which is sufficiently akin 
to that traditionally associated with race to support the application of heightened scrutiny to legisla-
tion disadvantaging the persistently poor. My efforts at translation in this piece did not entirely 
avoid treachery to my cause. 
125. On "the street," my book The Bakke Case: The Politics of Inequality (written with J. 
Dreyfuss) is considered my best work. It was written in the context of a particular political struggle. 
The primary audience was not academicians but students, workers, and others who were directly 
affected by and involved in that struggle. My colleagues at Stanford and Harvard assessed the work 
as "well written" and "interesting" but "not the kind of work that we require for tenure." I still 
have not heard a satisfactory explanation of what that kind of work is, but I did understand that it 
required speaking the academy's language. In writing the unconscious-racism piece I was not 
immune to the pressures of professional recoguition. 
126. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 9-11. ("I think, moreover, that there is a paradigm at work, 
in the persistent perceptions of me as inherent contradiction: a paradigm of larger social perceptions 
which divide public from private, black from white, dispossessed from legitimate. This realization, 
while extremely personal, inevitably informs my writing on a professionallevel."). 
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C. THE GIFT OF STORYTELLING: EMBRACING NARRATIVE 
We are a tongued folk. A race of singers. Our lips shape words 
and rhythms which elevate our spirits and quicken our blood. 127 
What I enjoy most in my work is the laughter and the outrage and 
the attention to language .... Forays to the Apollo with my daddy and 
hanging tough on Speakers Corner with my mama taught me the 
power of the word, the importance of the resistance tradition, and the 
high standards our community has regarding verbal performance. 128 
If the Word is to validate and legitimate the experience of those it 
seeks to serve, its form as well as its content must say to our brothers and 
sisters that what you see, think, and feel, the way you experience life and 
your creative articulation of that experience, is "scholarship/art"-is 
valid and of value. Storytelling, the articulation of experience and imagi-
nation in narrative, poetry, and song, is an important part of the tradition 
of Mrican peoples. 129 
There is also a tradition of storytelling in the law. Litigation is 
highly formalized storytelling.130 The drafting of a contract tells the 
story of an agreement and future expectations. But the law's tradition of 
storytelling is very different from the Mrican tradition. Where our tradi-
tion values rich contextual detail, the law excludes large parts of the 
story as irrelevant. Where we seek to convey the full range and depth of 
feeling, the law asks us to disregard emotions. Where we celebrate the 
127. Maya Angelou, Shades and Slashes of Light. in BLACK WOMEN WRITERS, supra note 60, 
at 3-5. 
128. Bambara, supra note 90, at 43. 
129. The reverence for the word in traditional African thought and its transformative 
power in the changed historical conditions of America demanded that the word be used as 
a weapon and a shield from the cruel reality of American life. The capacity for speech 
(that is, the capacity to rap) assumed a primary place in the culture of Afro-Americans; a 
necessary though not a sufficient condition for liberation. 
Cudjoe, supra note 60, at 10. 
See also Robert O'Meally, Frederick Douglass' 1845 Narrative: The Text Was Meant to Be 
Preached. in AFRo-AMERICAN LITERATURE, supra note 100, at 192 (exploring the use of narrative 
in the tradition of the black preacher); ZoRA NEALE HURSTON, THE SANCTIFIED CHURCH (1983). 
130. The idea of legal disputes as formalized storytelling contests has long been a part of the 
folklore of advocacy. Quintillian, the Roman theorist of rhetoric, wrote: "The purpose of the state-
ment off acts (narration) is not merely to instruct, but rather to persuade the judge," and he went on 
to give much advice about techniques of persuasive narrative. MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILIANUS, 
INSfITUTIONIS ORATORIAE (Clarendon Press 1958). Similarly, John W. Davis wrote in his classic 
The Argument of an Appeal that "the statement of the facts is not merely a part of the argument, it is 
more often than not the argument itself. A case well stated is a case far more than half argued." 26 
A.B.A. J. 896 (1940). 
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specific and the personal, the law tells stories about disembodied "reason-
able men." Where our tradition is oral, anticipating that the story will 
change with each new teller and listener, the law gives primacy to the 
words within the four corners of the contract or evidentiary record, mak-
ing time stand still and silencing the storyteller who comes with news of 
events or understandings that preceded or followed the written word.!3! 
But the most important difference in these traditions is that they 
embody different sets of stories. Our stories have, for the most part, not 
been told or recorded in the literature that is the law. Accordingly, the 
first reason for embracing narrative is that more of our stories must be 
told and heard.132 We remain invisible and unheard in the literature that 
is the evidentiary database for legal discourse, and when we are seen, in 
stories told by others, our images are severely distorted by the lenses of 
fear, bias, and misunderstanding. 
There is great persuasive power in narrative. Sara Lawrence 
Lightfoot locates the source of this power in the story's ability to inspire 
feelings of commonality and connectedness among tellers, listeners, and 
the subjects of stories: 
[S]tories express depth and complexity. They allow for ambiguity, 
multiple interpretation, and refracted images. The reader or listener 
can be convinced and moved, by intellect and emotion. And stories 
are not exclusive property. One story invites another as people's words 
weave the tapestry of human connection. 133 
Consider the insight, the compellingly articulated nonrational 
knowledge, that is contained in the following student reflection pieces 
responding to readings I assigned in recent classes on title II of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and on the First Amendment and racist speech. 
Heart of Atlanta Motel (Sometimes, news travels slowly.) 
Summer, 1965. Father, mother, brother, me. En route to New 
York City, by way of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., 
131. See Thomas Grey, Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment: The Uses of an 
Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 211 (1988) (discussing the textualism implicit in the 
parol evidence rule). See also infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (discussing the City of 
Richmond case). 
132. Several scholars of color have called for the use of narratives as a way to bring these stories 
of our communities to the legal discourse. See Richard Delgado, Story Telling for Oppositionists and 
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 M!CH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Matsuda, supra note 16. See generally 
BELL HOOKS, PHILOSOPHY NOT THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984) (suggesting that the 
theorist first look to the experiences of those at the margin). 
133. Sara Lawrence Lightfoot, Balm in Gilead: On Love, Justice and the Word, Speech 
Presented to the Equal Rights Advocates Annual Luncheon (June 15, 1988) (transcript on file with 
author). 
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and Annapolis, Maryland. First stop Annapolis, late, tired from hours 
of driving, and hungry. Hotel, after hotel, after hotel, we find. Simply 
no room for a family like mine. Brother to the rescue. Colored bell-
hop gives directions to the nearest colored inn. Where we find club 
sandwiches and a good night's sleep. 
I could talk about how it felt to see my father go in and out of 
those red and brown brick buildings, in the rain, wondering how they 
said what they said to him, but I've promised myself not to get angry 
this trip. Anyway, my grandfather earned a good living for many 
years as the proprietor of two colored hotels in Columbus, Ohio, made 
profitable by the grace of segregation. 
"What/actors have made it harder to integrate the schools than to inte-
grate the lunch counters, buses and hotels?" 
The white folks at lunch counters 
Work the same too long 
For the same too little 
While we pay, side by side, 
For the privilege that is not. 
And we pay, 
Though the key to the hotel suite 
Opens neither minds nor opportunity. 
And we pay, 
Though the ribs in the bottom are sweet. 
White folks never give, only sell 
That which is worth less. 
And we pay. 
Protecting Racist Speech 
Last summer, a summer associate and I drove from Memphis to Nash-
ville to see a concert. The next morning, her car broke down just 
outside of Nashville so we spent the day in a small town waiting to get 
it fixed. We sat in the convenience store connected to the gas station/ 
repair shop watching customers come and go. One young woman 
wore a t-shirt saying: 
"FIFTH ANNUAL NIGGER NATIONALS" 
"THE FREE RIDE IS OVER" 
Between the two lines was a drawing of a black man in chains being 
pulled in opposite directions by two white men on motorcycles. The 
black man held a banner saying, "Get back, Jack." Would Justice 
Black consider this "addressed to or 'about individuals"? I don't think 
she planned on running into me (needless to say, we did not acknowl-
edge each other) or any other blacks on that day. Does that matter? 
Why should it matter that the depiction was of a cartoonish character 
and not of someone in specific? 
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Friday Night Videos, Apri115, 1988. Two white comedians host. One 
describes the Democratic frontrunners as Spanky, Buckwheat, and 
Alfalfa. Goes on to say that the white voters of Wisconsin finally woke 
up and realized they couldn't vote for Jackson because, "It is the 
'White' House and, after all, rules are rules." Both have a good laugh. 
I'm not interested in banning books or in monitoring Klan meetings, 
but those bastards came into my home and burned a cross right in the 
middle of my living room. 
It is this power of narrative to build bridges of validation, under-
standing, and empathy that makes it so powerful as an intellectual and 
political tool. We must "flood the market with our stories."134 Only 
when these stories are told will we begin to recognize the limitations and 
distortions of narrowly constructed traditional legal analysis. Only as 
these rich and varied stories are increasingly heard will we begin to shape 
a new public discourse. 
1. Narrative as Methodology for Contextualization 
Stories always refer to a particular context, place, and moment. The 
historical and cultural setting is critical to the reader's interpretation of 
facts, feelings, and understandings. Much of legal analysis is both ahis-
torical and acontextual. 135 Human problems considered and resolved in 
the absence of context are often misperceived, misinterpreted, and mis-
handled. But the hazards and liabilities of noncontextual interpretation 
and decision making are not experienced randomly. Blacks and others 
whose stories have been and are excluded from the dominant discourse 
are more likely to be injured by the error of noncontextual methodology. 
134. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 65 (1988). I think it is 
important to say here that for me, "flooding the market with our stories" is an activity that should be 
engaged in primarily for our benefit-for the benefit of those whose stories have not been heard. 
Although it is important that those who are powerful, and whose voices are consequently dominant, 
hear our stories, the mere hearing of them will not alter the power relationship and the resultant 
authority to give credence and value to those stories. This can only occur through our engagement 
in active political struggle. We must flood the market with our stories because they will inform that 
struggle. Cf Christine Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes. 41 STAN. 
L. REV. 751 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), MacK-
innon's critique of liberal feminism). 
Thus liberal feminists make liberal theory respond to women's situation, but only on liber-
alism's terms. The 'women' who are made comprise merely an idea that can be changed by 
attention to the empirical reality of female individuals acting like individuals. Unfortu-
nately, this only works when those who know they are individuals (men) recognize the 
behavior of women as 'acting like an individual.' 
ld. at 758. 
135. See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship. 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981). 
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This is because the reader considering facts and abstract argument with-
out context will inevitably provide a setting of his or her own. This 
imaginary, though often unacknowledged, contextualization will be 
based on his or her experiences or upon stories that he or she has heard. 
The imagined context often directly contradicts the context that would 
be described by the stories of individuals who are actually involved. 
For example, in the case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
Justice O'Connor adopts an ahistorical, noncontextual analysis in finding 
that there was "no direct evidence of race discrimination on the part of 
the city in letting contracts or any evidence that the city's prime contrac-
tors had discriminated against minority owned subcontractors.,,136 In 
declining to hear the many stories that might describe the experience of 
pervasive historical and contemporary racism in Richmond, stories that 
would give the city's set-aside policy a compelling purpose, she substi-
tutes stories of her own, stories told by those who have not been the 
victims of racism. The unarticulated, perhaps unconscious, thought pro-
cess underlying her opinion goes as follows: 
I have not seen or heard stories of discrimination that have moved me 
to empathize with the black person who has been denied access to the 
contracting business. In fact, the stories I have heard are stories about 
men and women who are able to go as far as their talents and motiva-
tion will take them. 
Thus, Justice O'Connor is able to speculate that perhaps the dearth of 
minority contractors can be explained by the small number of blacks who 
desire to become contractors. 137 Justice O'Connor's substitute context is 
also shaped by an abstract ideal-the "color blind" society. Thus, 
implicitly she treats this ideal as if it had already been achieved. 138 The 
set-aside program is placed in the setting of a society where discrimina-
tion has been eradicated. Consequently, the city must present evidence 
that Richmond is an aberration, an exception in this society that is free of 
racism. Furthermore, she warns against the creation of race conscious-
ness in the future, raising the specter of the destruction of this already 
achieved ideal. 
136. 488 U.s. 469, 480 (1989). 
137. "[T)here are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority participation, including 
past societal discrimination in education and economic opportunities as wen as both black and white 
career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to industries other 
than construction." Id. at 503. 
138. See Joel Dreyfuss, The New Racism, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Jan. 1, 1978, at 410; Freeman, 
supra note 81; Charles R. Lawrence, III, Justice or 'Just Us': Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 831 (1983). See also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind," 
44 STAN. L. REV. I (1991). 
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If we are to bring fairness and justice to legal interpretation and 
discourse, those processes must be informed by the context of history and 
culture. Our stories must become a chief source of that 
contextualization. 
2. Stories as Text: Narrative as a Form of Knowing 
It is not enough for us to tell our stories. We must use them as text 
for research and interpretation. Giving narrative form to experience cre-
ates a rich evidentiary record for analysis and assessment of complex 
social processes. This text will look quite different from that which has 
served as a ground of inquiry for research and discourse in an academy 
dominated by white men. This is so because new stories will be told and 
heard. But it is also essential that narrative be valued as a source of 
data. 139 
In embracing the use of narrative as cultural text, practitioners of 
the Word must consider and employ methodologies of research and 
interpretation that draw upon the wealth of articulated experience and 
feelings contained in our stories. These methodologies must also serve to 
give legitimacy and authority to this way of knowing. In the white male 
academy, narrative is valued primarily as an instrument of private 
expression and self-actualization. Scientists and politicians may occa-
sionally employ the private sphere of literature as a diversionary escape 
or they may find, in literary criticism, useful paradigms for the interpre-
tation of legal or cultural text. But narrative is most often viewed by 
legal scholars and other social scientists as a source of distortion rather 
than as a resource for understanding. 140 
Fortunately, we are not without role models in our efforts to give 
authority to narrative. There is a strong tradition among black scholars 
of wedding literary narrative to social/political science. Frederick 
Douglass, W.E.B. Du Bois, Zora Neal Hurston, Paul Robeson, Ira Reid, 
and Pauli Murray all found artistic expression to be an important source 
139. See BLANCA G. SILVESTRINI, WOMEN AND REsISTANCE: HER STORY IN CoNTEMPO-
RARY CARIBBEAN HISTORY (1990) (discussing the use of narrative in political and social reform). 
140. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 
(1988) (suggesting that while intellectually interesting, the Law and Literature movement can offer 
little by way of social reform and that law and literature are and should remain separate disciplines). 
"One potentially troublesome feature of the Law and Literature Movement is that it seems to draw 
some of its law-trained practitioners away [from law]." ld. at 362. 
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of social/political knowledge as well as an indispensible vehicle for shar-
ing that knowledge. Du Bois' Souls of Black Folk 141 is perhaps the para-
digmatic example of literature as social science and political theory.142 
Other examples include Du Bois' autobiography, Dusk of Dawn, 143 and 
the autobiographical works of Douglass, Hurston, Hughes, and Murray. 
Narrative is valuable as text because it is dense in the detailed and 
moving articulation of the teller's or subject's life experience and feeling. 
Paradoxically, its value as a vehicle for cultural interpretation also arises 
out of its capacity to create space for the reader's imagination. Patricia 
Williams' work is exemplary in this use of narrative. In applying the 
insights of critical theory to the jurisprudence of rights, she uses language 
and style in a self-conscious effort to unearth understandings that the law 
has buried in arcane vocabulary and abstraction. She says of her work: 
It is not my goal merely to simplify; I hope that the result is a text that 
is multilayered-that encompasses the straightforwardness of real life 
and that reveals complexity of meaning. I am trying to create a genre 
of legal writing to fill the gaps of traditional legal scholarship. I would 
like to write in a way that reveals the intersubjectivity of legal con-
structions, that forces the reader both to participate in the construction 
of meaning and to be conscious of that process. 144 
In the form of her argument, Williams presents a paradigm for its 
substantive themes. She critiques partializing, constricting social/legal 
construction in which rights are conceived as islands of empowerment 
and where there is no safe haven for those whose life is not described and 
inscribed by those islands. In making this critique, Williams seeks to 
practice what she preaches by employing narrative to create framework, 
setting, and tone that are inclusive, not exclusive. She uses words with 
multifaceted meanings so that different readers will bring different mean-
ings to the text, and so that the same reader will recognize the many 
possibilities of meaning. She describes personal experiences that most of 
her audience will have shared to introduce analogous unshared exper-
iences. She leaves thoughts and scenes unfinished and white space on the 
printed page. Her images are both powerful and muted. Her prose is 
both spare and dense. If these adjective pairs seem paradoxical, they are. 
Our own imaginations, our own experiences, provide the density that fills 
the space she creates. 
141. See Du BOIS, supra note 13. 
142. See infra notes 147·48 and accompanying text. 
143. W.E.B. Du BOIS, DUSK OF DAWN (Transaction Books 1984). 
144. Williams, supra note 14, at 6-8. 
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It is the space created in good narrative, the invitation to identify 
with the literary character, that allows the reader to enter into the story 
and know the SUbjective experience of another. Robin West describes 
how stories advance our empathic ability and moral competence. 
While reading narrative literature, a reader recognizes dimensions of a 
character's subjectivity to which the character himself is blind and 
constantly discovers dimensions of her own character as well, of which 
she was previously unaware. As Gademer rightly insists, we "discover 
ourselves" as we engage in dialogue with texts, and part of what we 
discover in the text as well as in ourselves are wants, needs, prejudices, 
desires, and even "preferences" which we did not know we had, and 
for which we have no plausible explanation, so long as we focus nar-
rowly on our "individualist" histories. 145 
In short, narrative text facilitates our knowledge of others by its capacity 
for rich and complex contextual description of events and emotions. At 
the same time, stories leave space for interpretive intervention that fur-
thers our ability to know ourselves and discover our interrelationship 
with others. 
3. "Poetry Is Not a Luxury'~· Narrative as Imagination as Social Text 
The gift of storytelling is especially precious to those who would 
practice the Word because it is the narrative form that gives license and 
authority to imagination. Through stories, poems, and dreams we are 
able to explore inarticulate feeling and experience and give them name 
and form. Imagination is the key to our deepest insights and sympathies. 
It allows us to create, "in the mind or in an outward form ... images of 
things once known but absent, of things never seen in their entirety, of 
things actually nonexistent, of things created new from diverse old ele-
ments, or of things perfected or idealized."146 
In writing about the life of W.E.B. Du Bois, Arnold Rampersad 
identifies Du Bois' imagination as the sine qua non of his genius and 
notes that it was this faculty that compelled and pervaded his life's work 
as a historian, sociologist, journalist, activist, teacher, and autobiogra-
pher. Rampersad presents Du Bois' life as "a paradigm of the place of 
imagination in the practical world."147 Du Bois was a sometime poet, 
145. Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 
867,870 (1986). See generally HANs-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (1976) 
(discussing the problem of self-understanding). 
146. See Arnold Rampersad, The Art and Imagination of W.E.B. Du Bois 4 (1976) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). 
147. ld. at 5. 
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dramatist, and novelist, and while this literary work was more avocation 
than vocation, his work as a social scientist and activist is also suffused 
with poetry and narrative. 
Du Bois declined to see a separation between science and art, believing 
that such a distinction violated the integrity of intelligence, which 
could set no wall between one fundamental form of knowledge and 
another, since all belonged to the world of nature, of truth . . .. He 
devoted himself to a knowledge of this world equal to the power of his 
mind to imagine a better one. Science-social science, historical sci-
ence, the daily observations of persons, places, events-became the 
mast to which the sail of the imaginary was lashed. 148 
The use of literature and literary criticism to inform legal analysis 
remains at the fringes of legal discourse but is sufficiently well repre-
sented in legal academia to be called a "movement.,,149 I will suggest, 
however, that there are critical differences in the way the Law and Liter-
ature movement has used and valued stories and the paradigm that is 
presented in the work ofDu Bois, Hurston, and Hughes. Most advocates 
of a literary analysis of the law view law and the humanities as two dis-
tinct enterprises distinguished in the main by different goals and 
purposes. 
The Law and Literature movement has advanced a number of argu-
ments for the desirability of informing the legal enterprise with the narra-
tive voice. One such argument is similar to one that I made earlier: 
Traditional legal discourse is dominated by an abstract, mechanistic, pro-
fessional, and rationalist voice, a voice that would be well complemented 
by the concrete, empathetic, passionate, human voice of literary narra-
tive. Thus, Julius Getman argues that legal education and scholarship 
are impoverished by the "undervaluing of 'human voice.' "ISO Getman 
stresses the value of "language that uses ordinary concepts and familiar 
situations" as an adversarial tool, but also notes the power of such lan-
guage in undermining the self-serving belief among academicians that 
their sophistication gives them a special and more authoritative perspec-
tive on legal issues. Paul Gerwirtz makes a different but related point by 
148. [d. 
149. West, supra note 145. 
150. Julius Getman, Colloquy: Human. Voice in Legal Discourse, 66 TEX. L. REV. 577, 582 
(1988). Getman argues that teaching skills in presenting the human voice should be an important 
feature of legal education, noting that "successful lawyering frequently requires human understand-
ing far more than it does intellectual rigor." [d. He also laments the virtual absence of this voice 
from legal scholarship. [d. at 584. 
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reminding us that passion, intuition, and feeling are inevitable cohabi-
tants with reason in law, and by arguing that literature advances the legal 
enterprise "because it nourishes the kinds of human understanding not 
achievable through reason alone.,,151 I agree fully with both of these 
observations. But, as I have noted earlier, blacks and other marginalized 
persons are doubly disabled by the exclusion of the narrative voice. 152 
For those of us whose story has not been told, an expansion of the scope 
and nature of the text has particularly important, and even revolution-
ary, implications. 
A second important theme of the Law and Literature movement 
focuses on what the law can learn from literature as a parallel form of 
cultural interpretation. Ronald Dworkin, the chief proponent of this 
theme, urges that literary criticism serve as a paradigm for the interpreta-
tion of legal texts. If the role of literary criticism is to find the way of 
reading a text that shows it as the best possible work of art, then by 
analogy interpreters of legal texts should seek the meaning that enables 
the text to manifest the soundest principle of social or political philoso-
phy it can embody. 153 This suggested use of literary interpretation as an 
analogue for legal interpretation rests on Dworkin's vision of the unity of 
ethics and aesthetics in a larger cultural or social text. It is a vision that 
he shares with James Boyd White. White urges the integration of law 
and literature as a way of understanding the contingency in all intellec-
tual, artistic, and political forms and of knowing that writers and readers 
delineate and define communities and cultures through the creation and 
interpretation of text. 154 
These insights are valuable, but their value is limited, indeed they 
may even be counterproductive, for those individuals and groups whose 
life experience has been largely excluded from "the text." Robin West 
recognizes this danger when she notes that White's vision of a culture 
shaping its ideals and moral codes through the criticism of shared consti-
tutive texts is "unduly bound by the very text he sets out to criticize."155 
Like the community he criticizes, the critic's morality is the product of 
151. Paul Gewirtz, Aeschylus' Law. 101 HARV. L. REv. 1043, 1050 (1988). 
152. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text. 
153. Ronald Dworkin. Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527 (1982). reprinted in THE 
POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION. supra note 51. at 249. 
154. James Boyd White. Law and Literature: No Manifesto. 39 MERCER L. REv. 739 (1986). 
155. Robin West. Communities. Texts. and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature Move-
ment, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129. 138 (1988). 
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the community's texts. "The result is social criticism which is con-
strained and stunted by the texts it criticizes."156 The "constraint" to 
which West refers is caused by the exclusion of outsiders; those whose 
voice is not heard and who are therefore not part of the community's 
constitutive and defining text. 
[T]hose who are excluded from participation simply do not exist for 
the Whitean "moral textualist." Because they do not participate as 
subjects in the process of critique and self-transformation, they become 
literally objectified ... because they are outside the community, they 
do not speak; because they do not speak. they are objects. 157 
This exclusion and objectification is for West, and for me, the more 
serious problem. If social criticism is grounded in texts that systemati-
cally exclude certain voices, then the critics will never see the excluded. 
They will be morally invisible. 158 
But I am not entirely sanguine about West's proposed solution to 
the oppressive inadequacies of "Whitean moral textualism."159 For it 
seems to me that West's "different answer to the questions of 'how we 
form community' and 'how we might form better ones' ,,160 does not 
promise more inclusion and may well perpetuate the objectification of 
blacks and other outsiders. West substitutes an "interactive commu-
nity,,161 for the community that is defined by text. She says that this 
community will be more inclusive because it will include those with 
whom we interact in nontextual ways, those we oppress and violate and 
those with whom we are loving and intimate. She argues that "the way 
to improve our nontextual interactive community is not to 'transform' 
our texts, but ourselves."162 
My uneasiness with West's formulation lies not in her desire to 
broaden the scope of the interpretive enterprise. Rather, it derives from 
her reasons for abandoning the textual metaphor. In examining the 
oppressive objectification of textualism West contrasts two novels, Mark 
Twain's Huckleberry Finn and Toni Morrison's Beloved. 
Beloved takes as its explicit subject matter the very problem with 
"moral textuaIism" which Huckleberry Finn only illustrates: "moral 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 140. 
158. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text, discussing Ellison's prologue to Invisible 
Man. 
159. West, supra note 155, at 132. 
160. Id. at 146. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 147. 
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textualism" objectifies by excluding those who do not participate in the 
production, interpretation, or criticism of a society's texts. Huckle-
berry Finn illustrates the problem with authorial irony, but Beloved 
explores and corrects it. In Beloved, the silenced and objectified com-
municate and become subjects. In Beloved, those on the outside of the 
textual community-the dead, the illiterate, the young, the foreign, the 
gagged-speak without speech to those on the inside. 
The illiterate and the linguistically incompetent impose their 
presence .... 
The gagged, the excluded, and the objectified all become 
sUbjects .... 
Beloved explores communications to, from, and among the textu-
ally excluded. When the textually excluded communicate in Beloved, 
they communicate without texts. They communicate, instead, through 
imagery .... 
They communicate with color ... and body language, song, dance, 
and play .... 163 
There is a striking ambivalence in West's language here. She speaks 
of objects who become subjects and yet these subjects are "without 
speech" and "linguistically incompetent." The characters in Beloved 
communicate "without texts." Instead they use color, body language, 
song, dance, and play. West sees that Morrison has turned Twain's 
objects into subjects by giving them voice, but their voice is not "text." 
And it seems that she has done something more than simply make the 
observation that Dworkin, White, and Twain's community of critics will 
not hear these voices or know this is text when they see it. For even 
when the characters in Beloved communicate with each other, when they 
sing and dance for themselves, West sees them communicating "without 
texts." 
West suggests that we adopt the paradigm of "interactive communi-
ties" because she abhors and condemns the exclusion of those "without 
texts,,,I64 but I fear that in this description she has inadvertently com-
pounded the objectification, or at best failed to escape what she calls "the 
unbreakable circle of objectivity.,,16s 
Why are Morrison's characters "linguistically incompetent"? Their 
language is rich and moving and conceptually precise. Why are song and 
163. Id. at 141-43. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 140. 
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dance atextual? I see these characters engaged in a parallel text, a text 
that constitutes another community in which those who are objectified 
by the dominant society become subjects. The speakers of this text are 
surely as linguistically competent as those who objectify them. West her-
self notes that their language expresses feelings as well as words. And 
this community's text is broader than that of the excluding community, 
for while Morrison's character Sethe may not have known of the Dred 
Scott decision,166 she almost certainly understood white folks better than 
they understood her. 167 
My insistence that the voices of the excluded be viewed as text is 
more than a matter of semantics. The ability to produce text, to stand in 
the position of subject and tell one's own story, is central to one's human-
ity and one's freedom. It is central to the Word. The fact that our text 
has been largely oral does not mean that it is not a text. Morrison 
becomes an exemplary practitioner of the Word by her own valuing of 
this oral text in Beloved. Historian Blanca Silvestrini, in discussing the 
use of women's stories in Caribbean historiography, speaks of the exclu-
sion of Puerto Rican women from written texts and of the importance of 
valuing oral text: 
But most of our women did not have access to the written word. For 
some publishing was beyond any reasonable expectation; they lacked 
the power, both of making their stories thinkable in a media controlled 
by men and of making it appear in print. For others, like my grand-
mother, a large portion of the written text was inaccessible; they were 
not given the gift of the written word. Does this mean then that a 
majority of women in the Caribbean were voiceless, thus ahistorical 
166. In speaking of the central character in Morrison's book, West says, "Sethe, for example, 
does not know the Dred Scott decision. She never read it, criticized it, or participated in any other 
way in its production or transformation." Id. at 145. While it is true that Morrison does not speak 
of Sethe's knowledge of Dred Scott, it is also true that news of white folks' goings-on traveled 
quickly in the black community, slave and free. Morrison's book powerfully captures the vitality of 
this community'S "grapevine." Sethe may well have heard of Dred Scott, and if she did, her textual 
community'S interpretation of this text was probably a good deal more accurate than the interpreta-
tion it was given by the dominant legal community. Certainly the text produced by this commu-
nity-the text of Nat Turner's rebellion, David Walker's appeal, and Harriet Tubman's underground 
railroad-inspired the text of Chief Justice Taney's effort to prop up the crumbling regime of 
slavery. 
167. See OYONO FERDINAND, HOUSEBOY (1966), a novel set in western Africa. This is part of 
a large body of work explicating master-servant relationships, where servants are well versed in all of 
the intimacies of their masters' lives while their masters know almost nothing of them. In the pro-
logue to Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man, the narrator's victim never sees him but the narrator sees his 
victim and even projects himself into the victim's consciousness. ELLISON, supra note 101, at 3. 
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and without culture, or does it point to the need to revise our concep-
tions of what makes a voice a historical source?168 
This understanding of the existence of and the need to validate a 
parallel text among those who are excluded and objectified by the domi-
nant text is what separates the use of narrative by those who would prac-
tice the Word from its use by the mainstream of the Law and Literature 
movement. For us, the contextualization of ethical debate, the recogni-
tion of the contingency and complexity of textual meaning, and, above 
all, the assertion of our SUbjective presence as creators and interpreters of 
text are political acts. 
The practitioner of the Word does not view art and literature as a 
privatized enterprise. No less than the social/political sciences, the arts 
and literature are viewed as informing and defining public discourse and 
morality. The way one is portrayed in literature and the way one's own 
stories are valued are symbolic of one's status in the culture and in the 
body politic. Moreover, our literature is a necessary vehicle of our libera-
tion. Audre Lorde rightly insists that 
poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of our existence. It forms 
the quality of light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams 
towards survival and change, first made into language, then into idea, 
then into more tangible action. Poetry is the way we help give name to 
the nameless so it can be thought. . .. [A]s they become known to and 
accepted by us, our feelings and honest exploration of them become 
sanctuaries and spawning grounds for the most radical and daring of 
ideas. They become a safe house for that difference so necessary to 
change and the conceptualization of any meaningful action. 169 
Lorde's recognition of storytelling as the birthplace of revolutionary 
theory reaffirms a tradition that values the transposition of feelings and 
experience into language as a political discipline. 
D. THE GIFT OF THE DREAM: EMBRACING UTOPIA 
I heard a loud voice in the heavens, and the spirit instantly appeared to 
me and said ... I should arise and prepare myself, and slay my ene-
mies with their own weapons ... for the time was fast approaching 
when the first should be last and the last should be first. 
-Nat Turner, 1831 
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the 
true meaning of its creed . . . . 
168. Silvestrini, supra note 139, at 29. 
169. AUDRE LoRDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984). 
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I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of 
former slaves and the sons of former slaveowners will be able to sit 
down together at the table of brotherhood .... 
I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation 
where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the 
content of their character. 
-Martin Luther King, 1963 
Perhaps the greatest gift bestowed upon practitioners of the Word is 
the_gift of the dream. 170 It is also the most elusive gift. It is both difficult 
t~ define and infrequently bestowed. Dreams are unconscious and 
instinctual. They are more closely related to feeling and emotion than to 
rational thought, more akin to matters of the spirit than to matters of 
science. Thus, dreaming is thought to be the occupation of religious 
leaders, poets, and indolents. It is hardly considered a scholarly 
endeavor. But the scholar who would also be a freedom fighter must not 
be afraid to dream. For dreams are by their nature liberating. Further-
more, those who are gifted with the talent of dreaming are often engaged 
in some way with the work of liberation. Dreamers, be they prophets, 
politicians, or philosophers, challenge established understandings with 
the new and unfamiliar. 
Black Americans, as a people and a culture, have been dreamers. 171 
We have valued our dreams and respected their power. 172 As a commu-
nity we have taken seriously the heightened empathy of the child born 
with a caul. 173 We have listened to the voices of our ancestors even when 
we did not know where those voices came from. 174 We have venerated 
170. I use the word "dream" here to refer both to the symbolic language, visions, or uncon· 
scious thoughts that we experience during sleep or in trancelike states, and to the consciously con-
ceived hope, goal, or insight about a heretofore-unimagined idea. I believe that these two sorts of 
dreaming, the dreams of the prophet and the dreams of the genius, are closely related. See CARL 
GUSTAV JUNG, MAN AND HIS SYMBOLS 5 (1964) (discussing the way dreams incorporate arche-
typal, symbolic language). 
17.1. I believe that this is true of most cultures whose spirituality or religion is rural or natural in 
origin. It is safe to say that ali religion has its origins in man's relationship to nature and that in the 
early, or "primitive," stages of man's development, before urbanization and the imposition ofhierar-
chy and bureaucracy, religious practitioners were more open to the psychic properties of nature, to 
dreams and visions. It is not coincidental that the Jews of the Bible so often saw visions from God, 
that the Druids of the first century B.C. were seers and visionaries, and that dreams are so central to 
the religions of the Native American tribes. Nor is it an accident that it is the oppressed who have 
most often been dreamers. 
172. JUNG, supra note 170, at 52-53 (describing a culture whose members did not believe 
dreams to be important and consequently did' not believe they dreamed). 
173. See TINA ANSA, BABY OF THE FAMILY. See also LIGHTFOOT, supra note 6, for Margaret 
Lawrence's description of her family's story of the origin of her special insight and healing talents. 
174. See TONI MORRISON, BELOVED (1987) (drawing upon that part of black culture that is 
open to messages from ghosts). 
1992] THE WORD AND THE RIVER 2293 
those women and men within our communities who knew how to heal 
psychic wounds through prayer and the laying on of hands. 175 And there 
has been a special place in our hearts for those with visions of new and 
better futures. It is the revolutionary dreamer who is most revered in the 
black community.176 
Those who have enslaved and oppressed blacks have told a story of 
a people whose indolence, irrationality, excess of passion, and supersti-
tion justified their subordinated status. The black scholar who calls upon 
his colleagues to dream must be careful to distinguish his position from 
any that supports this stereotype of the naive primitive ruled by emotion 
and belief in the fantastic. In insisting upon the value of inspirational 
insight I do not intend to imply that rigorous rational analysis is not a 
critical part of this work. Dreams, sleeping or wakeful, may inspire the 
breakthrough to a new paradigm, but the work of carefully and critically 
testing that paradigm is essential. 
1. The Dream as Reconstructionist History 
Dreams serve the practitioner of the Word because they reconstruct 
history. I have discussed the value of reconstructionist history to the 
cause of liberation in the section on subjectivity as positioned perspective. 
It is particularly important for those whose story has been told by those 
responsible for their oppression to reconsider that story and retell it.l77 
Much of what we experience as dreams is the expression of memory. 
Images, ideas, thoughts, and feelings, once experienced, are forced into 
unconsciousness because there is not enough room in the conscious 
mind 178 or because the experience or feeling is painful or upsetting and is 
thus repressed from consciousness.179 These "forgotten" experiences, 
this history housed in the unconscious, emerge in dreams.180 Moreover, 
dreams often reveal those aspects of experience and feeling that are most 
175. Toni Morrison's character Baby Suggs in the novel Beloved embodies these members of our 
communities. 
176. Nat Turner, Harriet Tubman, Sojourner Truth, Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X. 
177. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text. 
178. See Lawrence, supra note 51, at 336. 
179. "Freudian theory states that the human mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt 
by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conllict with what the indi-
vidual has learned is good or right." ld. at 322. 
180. The dream is a specific expression of the unconscious. JUNG, supra note 170, at 6. 
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difficult for us to recognize or acknowledge. 181 Thus, our dreams provide 
us with historical material for reconstruction, and they often begin the 
reconstructive project by bringing to the fore those aspects of memory 
that have previously been repressed. 
In the dream that appears in the prologue to this Article I encounter 
a familiar experience. A member of the academic establishment ques-
tions the value of my work and challenges me to prove that I am deserv-
ing of my position in his elite company. The images in the dream 
represent both recent memories and memories from my law school days. 
I am confronted with my dream antagonist's challenge each day in dis-
cussions with colleagues, in the literature, and in judicial opinions about 
affirmative action, appointments, admissions, and scholarship. In my 
waking life the challenge is not made so forthrightly, and it is rarely 
made directly to or about me. It is made more obliquely in discussions 
about the qualifications or work of other colleagues or students of color. 
Most often my response is to repress the feelings of inadequacy, self-
doubt, hurt, and anger, to pretend that the discussion is not about me, to 
pretend not to have heard the challenge. At other times, I join the dis-
cussion accepting the ground rules of politeness and abstraction as well 
as the premises of dominant theory. 
The dream presents the challenge and my reaction to that challenge 
more starkly, more vividly, and more truly. The disguises of abstract 
argument, hypothetical case, theoretical construct, and polite form have 
been removed. The full force of my feelings has been recaptured and 
expressed. By this re-presentation the dream has begun to reconstruct 
history. By valuing the message of the dream I am able to continue that 
reconstruction in interpretive conversations with others who have shared 
the experience and resonate with the dream's vivid images. 
181. SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 252 (1965). A common dream 
among accomplished persons, for example, is one that reveals an unacknowledged insecurity, a fear 
that they may be discovered as a fraud. 
Just before classes are to begin in the fall of each term I have a dream with a recurring theme. I 
am in a class at the Yale Law School. I am already a full professor, but it has been discovered that I 
am stilI lacking one course for graduation from law school and I have been required to return to 
complete this course. The students in the class know that I am a professor from another institution 
and are familiar with the circumstances under which I have been required to take this course. I am 
totally unfamiliar with the material assigned for the class. I have not done the reading. I am certain 
that the instructor will calIon me first. 
One of my colleagues has the following recurring dream: He is in court sitting at counsel table, 
dressed in a conservative blue pinstripe suit. The judge asks him to approach the bench. He stands 
up and discovers that he does not have any pants on. 
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Derrick Bell uses similar dreamlike visions to do reconstructionist 
history. In The Chronicle of the Constitutional Contradiction 182 Geneva 
travels back in time to address the framers at the Constitutional Conven-
tion. We know that such a trip is fantastic, but we also know from 
Geneva that what she has experienced is real to her. Although Geneva 
and The Chronicle are Professor Bell's invention, it is no accident that 
Bell's message is presented in a form which, like a dream, is both fantas-
tic and real. Bell's chronicles are the waking dreams of the prophet/ 
poet. He must call upon that part of his consciousness that is not bound 
by reality. By opening himself to dreamlike fantasy he is inspired by 
parts of his experience that have been repressed as illegitimate, unaccept-
able, or in conflict with the dominant view of reality.183 
The Chronicle of the Constitutional Contradiction reconstructs his-
tory.184 Like the sleeping dream, it starkly presents those parts of the 
story that were sublimated and repressed.185 Geneva confronts the fram-
ers with the moral dilemma they sought to avoid, even forcing them to 
confront the enormity of the price their descendants will pay.186 The 
framers resist this intrusion on their consciousness as do many readers of 
Professor Bell's chronicle.187 
2. The Dream as Inspiration 
One can also speak of dreams as an expression of hope for the future 
or as an imagining of new possibilities. When Martin Luther King, Jr., 
spoke of having "a dream," he conveyed this meaning. The meaning 
contains both an optimism for a better future and a vision of how that 
future will be better. King's dream is inspirational in two senses: Its 
message is infectious and encouraging and its origin is spontaneous, a 
182. BELL, supra note 41, at 26. 
183. Many artists, philosophers, and even scientists owe some of their best ideas to inspirations 
that appear suddenly from the unconscious. JUNG, supra note 170, at 24-26. 
184. BELL, supra note 41, at 26. 
185. BELL, supra note 19, at 47. This is a metaphor for the repression of this reality from the 
national consciousness. ld. 
186. "Do you recognize," Geneva asks, "that in order to gain unity among yourselves, your 
slavery compromises sacrifice freedom for the Africans who live amongst you and work for you? 
Such sacrifices of the rights of one group of human beings will, unless arrested here, become a 
difficult-to-break pattern in the nation's politics." BELL, supra note 41, at 32. 
187. After an initial shocked silence, the delegates attempt to physically eject Geneva from their 
proceedings. "Woman! who are you and by what authority do you interrupt this gathering? ... 
How dare you insert yourself in these deliberations." ld. at 27-28. Bell notes that many colleagues 
resist the message of this chronicle, expressing appreciation for the power of the story while ignoring 
its message of racism's centrality to our social compact. Conversation with Derrick Bell (June 
1983). 
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seemingly divine imparting of knowledge, a brainstorm. Both of these 
elements of the wakeful dream are important to the practice of the Word. 
The sustained struggle for liberation from racial oppression must be fed 
by a faith in ultimate victory. A true revolution must be guided by ideas 
that do not arise from old paradigms of thought. 188 
To say that an oppressed people has a special capacity for hope may 
seem paradoxical, but the slave knows intuitively that the system of slav-
ery is vulnerable and that its destruction is inevitable. If this were not so, 
why would the master be so fearful of its demise? And why would he 
expend so many resources defending it? Mari Matsuda has noted that 
the attention given to maintaining conditions of racial oppression that 
"reveals the deep contradictions and instability inherent in any racist 
organization of social life." 189 
But much of our faith in the inevitability of the victory of good over 
evil is exactly that: a faith. It is a faith that is perhaps best summed up in 
the expression "The Lord don't like ugly."190 Although much of the 
black community grounds its faith in a theological belief, this faith in the 
ultilnate demise of racist structures does not depend upon a belief in 
God. Rather, our morality rests in our personal knowledge of the 
subordinator's fear and disease. "The third level of fear experienced by 
the master is the fear of self-discovery ... that he will understand that his 
need to define others as inferior and treat them as such comes from [and 
produces] his own feelings of inferiority.,,191 We know that racism ill 
serves the racists. We are hopeful because our vision, our morality, is a 
vision that will free us al1. 192 
We see this combination of hard-nosed skepticism and hopeful faith 
in the inevitability of a better world in the work of many scholars of 
color. One might expect that the work of people like Regina Austin, 
188. CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE 106-25 (1989) (on 
the impossibility of building the revolution with the oppressors' tools). 
189. Matsuda, supra note 16, at 2. 
190. Most of us first heard this expression from our grandmothers. It was used as an admoni-
tion to correct one's behavior, to invoke God's authority lest one might be foolhardy enough to 
believe that Grandma's authority were not enough. 
191. Lawrence, supra note 1, at 632. 
192. Several years ago a student approached me after my constitutional law class. In an earnest 
voice she asked how it was that I could maintain such a cheerful and optimistic attitude in my 
teaching when so much of what I taught was a story of the injustice of the law. I started to tell her 
that my positive tone was all a front, that I was angry and pessimistic and depressed. Then I realized 
that this was only partly true. I was more hopeful than not, and my optimism in the face of over-
whelming odds could only be explained by my belief in the righteousness of my cause and the fact 
that I didn't want to change places with any white folks. 
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Derrick Bell, Kimberle Crenshaw, Gerald Torres, Mari Matsuda, and 
Patricia Williams would have a pessimistic bent. Their critical analysis 
of the law, as both a product and promoter of racism deeply rooted in 
political and social structures, is certainly a less than hopeful story. But 
the ultimate tone of their writings and their daily works in the world 
evidence an undeniably positive view of humankind. 193 
The heightened ability of those who are oppressed to envision new 
possibilities is also a function of their discontent under the status quo. 
Those who are least well served by present structures and ideologies are 
most likely to dream of others that might serve them better. 
There is another element, in addition to that of hope, in King's 
dream. This is the vision of new possibilities. Dreams are liberating 
because of their spontaneous and inspirational quality. I believe that the 
power of this kind of wakeful dreaming, this imagining of possibilities, is 
related to the fantastic quality of unreality that it shares with the sleeping 
dream. 194 In utopian dreams we imagine the unknown. We think that 
which is not possible within existing paradigms.195 "But that's not possi-
ble" is not an adequate or even sensible rejoinder to one who asserts that 
she has a dream. A dreamer cannot be called to account because she 
does not have adequate evidence to support the feasibility of her dream. 
She can always reply, "I can dream, can't I?" Thus, dreams, like poetry, 
make the work of imagining new ideas a legitimate enterprise. Practi-
tioners of the word will find little to validate this dream-work in the halls 
of legal academia, but it is work that must be nurtured. 
193. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse. Worker Resistance. and the Tort of Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1988); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race. Reform. and 
Enfranchisement: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 
1331 (1988); Derrick Bell et al., Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation, 37 
UCLA L. REv. 1037 (1990); Marl J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent. Antidiscrimination Law. 
and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991); WILLIAMS. supra note 
14. See also, John Denvir, William Shakespeare and the Jurisprudence of Comedy, 34 STAN. L. REv. 
825, 848 (1987) (noting the optimism present in Derrick Bell's work as well as in my own). 
194. There may be another way the wakeful inspiration of the philosopher, physicist, or revolu-
tionary leader is related to the sleeper's dream. Psychologists have observed that there are always 
certain feelings, experiences, and events of which we have not consciously taken note. These events 
have remained, as it were, below the threshold of consciousness. They have been absorbed sublimi-
nally without our conscious knowledge. Jung notes that just as these events emerge into conscious-
ness in dreams, we may also become aware of them in a moment of intuition, inspiration or profound 
thought. While the thought seems new, we realize that it must be the product of past experience. 
"Though we may have originally ignored (its) emotional vital importance, it later wells up from the 
unconscious as a sort of afterthought." JUNG, supra note 170, at 5. 
195. There is another aspect of dreaming that engenders new insights. The symbolic language 
of a dream always stands for something more than its immediate meaning. It invites new and multi-
ple interpretations. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
This Article has its genesis in the history and tradition of radical 
teaching among dominated people of color who have made the struggle 
for liberation and humanization their life's work. We have inherited this 
vocation from parents and grandparents and from countless others who 
have resisted racial oppression. The meaning of "vocation" is central to 
the definition of this work. One is called upon to accept a legacy, but a 
vocation implies choice. One must choose to accept the gift and burden 
of this inheritance. One must choose to embrace the values of human-
ism. One must choose to engage in the practice of liberationist teaching. 
One must choose to join the river of struggle. I trust that this beginning 
effort at naming and describing this work will help to nurture and sustain 
those of my colleagues who have chosen to preach and practice the 
Word. I hope that it will encourage others to make that vocational 
choice and to join in the ongoing conversation that teaches freedom to us 
all. 
